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This dissertation consists of three essays, of which two are related. In the
rst essay I model the interaction between a franchisor and its franchisees. I
examine how a franchisor uses the investment requirements she asks franchisees
as a tool to reduce franchisees underprovision of sales e¤ort. Theoretically, I
show that if the franchisors reputation is highly important the franchisor asks
for higher investment requirements when penalizing a misbehaving franchise is
more di¢ cult (weaker law enforcement) and when directly monitoring franchisees
is more costly.
In the second essay, I empirically test the theoretical predictions of the rst
essay using two datasets at the franchisor level. I measure weak law enforcement
using the passing of state level good-cause termination/nonrenewal laws for fran-
chise contracts and I measure monitoring costs using the number of states in which
a franchisor operates. Using a database that contains information for 278 fran-
chisors, before and after the laws were passed in some states, I nd that the passing
of the laws implied an incremental 4.7% increase in investment requirements for
franchisors located in states where the laws were passed. Using a large database
(10,047 franchisor-year observations), posterior to the passing of the laws, I nd
that franchisors located in states where good-cause termination/nonrenewal laws
were passed ask for investment requirements 4.5% higher than franchisors located
in states without such laws. Using both datasets I nd evidence that franchisors
that expand their operations to an additional state increase the average investment
requirements they ask a prospective franchisee between 0.6-1%.
The third essay, which is in conjunction with Gordon Phillips, empirically
studies how nancial distress and bankruptcy a¤ects rms choices of product
quality and prices using data from the airline industry. We nd that an airlines
quality and pricing decisions are di¤erentially a¤ected by nancial distress and
bankruptcy. Product quality decreases when airlines are in nancial distress,
consistent with nancial distress reducing a rms incentive to invest in quality.
In addition, rms price more aggressively when in nancial distress consistent
with them trying to increase short-term market share and revenues. In contrast,
in bankruptcy product quality increases relative to nancial distress periods.
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Firms are complex decision-making organizations. They decide on the price
and quality of their products, their advertising strategy; they decide on how to bar-
gain with suppliers, how to design contracts with their business partners, how to
compensate their employees, etc. From an economists perspective, what is inter-
esting is to study whether there are systematic patterns in rmsdecision-making
and, if so, examine what causes those patterns. This dissertation studies the de-
terminants of franchisorsinvestment requirements and airlines product quality
and pricing decisions, shedding light on systematic patterns that were overlooked
in the literature. In particular, this dissertation studies how the misalignment
of incentives between rms stakeholders (e.g., owners, business partners, debt
holders, etc) can act as driving forces on rmsdecisions.
In a franchise setting, franchisees that operate under a common brand name
have incentives to free-ride on each others sales e¤ort. As a consequence, fran-
chisees tend to underprovide sales e¤ort relative to the sales e¤ort the franchisor
would like them exert. Sales e¤orts are not perfectly contractible as their observ-
ability is imperfect. As a consequence, the franchisor needs to boost franchisees
sales e¤orts indirectly, because if she does not boost them, her reputation will be
negatively a¤ected.
In the rst two essays, I show that a potential mechanism to boost franchisees
sales e¤ort is to ask them for higher investment requirements. Investment re-
quirements are the amount the franchisor asks the franchisees to invest in the
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opening of a new franchise unit. Investment requirements are easy to observe,
thus they do not su¤er from imperfect contractibility as is the case of sales e¤orts.
The intuition of how higher investment requirements can boost sales e¤ort is the
following. The more franchisees invest, the higher their selling capacity will be,
and thus, they will have more to lose in case of contract termination if they are
caught underproviding sales e¤ort. The fear of losing high rents disciplines the
franchiseesbehavior and, as a consequence, they increase sales e¤ort. The cost
of using investment requirements as a disciplining device is that the franchisees
are forced to over-invest relative to a situation where sales e¤orts are perfectly
contractible. The burden of the extra investment is ultimately borne by the fran-
chisor as she has to modify other dimensions of the franchise contract to make it
equally attractive to franchisees. Therefore, I expect to systematically observe a
franchisor asking for higher investment requirements when the incentives to pro-
vide sales e¤ort from franchisees are particularly weak, as when incentives are
weak is when the benet of boosting sales e¤ort compensates the costs of asking
for higher investment requirements. In other words, the less aligned the incentives
between franchisors and franchisees are the higher investment requirements will
be.
The rst essay provides theoretical evidence of two scenarios where franchisees
incentives are weaker and thus higher investment requirements are set to o¤set
those weak incentives: when penalizing a misbehaving franchise is more di¢ cult
(weaker law enforcement) and when directly monitoring franchisees is more costly.
These predictions nd empirical support in the second essay of the dissertation.
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In the third essay, Gordon Phillips and I study how rmsnancial condition
and bankruptcy can a¤ect rmsproduct quality and pricing decisions. Maksi-
movic and Titman (1991) theoretically studied the rmsincentives to cut quality
when in nancial distress, as rms may produce a lower quality product and at-
tempt to sell this product as higher quality in order to stave o¤ bankruptcy. A
similar argument can be given for the price decision as prices are likely to be
reduced in nancial distress in order to gain market share and avoid immediate
bankruptcy. This essay documents those phenomena using data from the airline
industry. In addition, it empirically documents a nding disregarded both by the
theoretical and empirical literature. Firmsquality increase in bankruptcy relative
to their nancial distress situation. This result is consistent with rms investing
in customer retention and reputation that enables them to get out of bankruptcy.
The ndings of the third essay can be easily interpreted in terms of incentives
misalignments. When the rmsdecision makers, either owners or managers acting
in behalf of owners, face nancial distress, their incentives are less aligned with
those of the debt holders as the potentially negative outcomes of their decisions
are bounded by bankruptcy. Debt holders, on the other hand, fully bear the bad
outcomes of the rms decisions as when the rm is declared bankrupt debt holders
become the new owners of the rm. If the rm reduces quality in nancial distress
and bankruptcy is not avoided, debt holders inherit a rm with a damaged product
quality reputation. Similarly, if the rm reduces prices in nancial distress and
bankruptcy is not avoided, debt holder might inherit a rm that operates under
a price war triggered by the price reduction initiated by the nancially distressed
rm. Thus, product quality reduction and price reduction in nancial distress
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are the consequence of incentives misalignment, between debt holders and equity
holders.
The goal of this dissertation is to provide a modest contribution to the under-
standing of rmsstrategies, according to their conict of interests between their
stakeholders. It is on my short-term agenda to continue studying how conicts of
interests can a¤ect other dimensions of rms. I leave for future research to study
how the conict of interest between debt holders and equity holders can shape
the structure of an organization and to study whether rmsbidding behavior,




Investment Requirements in Franchise Contracts as a
Self-Enforcing Device: A Theoretical Model
II.1-Introduction
Investment requirements in franchise contracts are the amount franchisors ask
franchisees to invest in the opening of a new franchise unit.1 The franchisor
determines the size of the outlet, species the architectural design and leasehold
improvements. She also determines the equipment and furniture the franchisee
needs to purchase. In addition, investment requirements usually include working
capital and sometimes money for the lease. It is commonly thought that once the
franchisors retailing format is dened, variations in the investment requirements
depend exclusively on the market characteristics where a franchise unit operates.
Contrary to that view, this essay sugsests that franchisors can strategically choose
the amount of investment requirements in order to discipline franchisees.
Franchise chains represent over 40% of retail sales in the United States accord-
ing to the International Franchise Association [IFA], 2004. Franchises encompass
variety of business formats. Educational services, such as day-cares, car repair
shops, fast food restaurants, clothing retailers and lodging are common formats
in franchises, just to mention a few.2 On average, the investment requirements
a franchisor asks franchisees is over half a million dollars.3 In spite of its great
1The franchisee covers 100% of this ex-ante investment.
2See table III.4 for a broader characterization of formats common to franchising.
3Using 15 years of Bonds franchise guide, for 2,017 franchisors, the average investment
requirements is $520,000.
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economic relevance, the determinants of investment requirements have not being
studied before, most likely because it is thought that the franchisor does not play
a major role in modifying them.
This paper proposes a theoretical model that endogenizes the investment de-
cision in franchise contracts. The model considers a moral hazard problem where
each franchisee can free-ride on the other franchiseessales e¤ort. This engenders
a misalignment of incentives between the franchisor and the franchisee even if the
franchisee is the residual claimant (zero royalty rate). As a consequence, fran-
chisees will underprovide sales e¤ort, hurting the franchisors reputation. Align-
ment of these incentives requires a self-enforcement mechanism. We consider that
investment requirements generate a permanent increase in franchisees earnings
as the more franchisees invest, the higher their selling capacity will be. In this
scenario, a franchisee that is asked for higher investment requirements will have
more to lose in case of contract termination. When a franchisees incentives to
provide the appropriate level of sales e¤ort are weak, the franchisor can correct
his incentives by requiring higher investments in order to generate the necessary
ex-post rents that discipline the franchisees behavior. While the higher ex-post
rents might not be su¢ cient to cover the extra investment that generates them,
asking for the extra investment might still be a protable strategy for the fran-
chisor, because it precludes the franchisee from underproviding sales e¤ort and
hurting the franchisors reputation, which is the franchisors most valuable asset.
In particular, the model concludes that if the franchisors reputation is highly
important the franchisor asks for higher investment requirements when penaliz-
ing a misbehaving franchise is more di¢ cult (weaker law enforcement) and when
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directly monitoring franchisees is more costly.
Most prominent works in theoretical franchise literature study franchisors roy-
alty rates and initial franchise fees decisions (see Mathewson and Winter (1985),
Lal (1990) and Bhattacharya and Lafontaine (1995)). These papers, however,
do not consider investment requirements as a contract term. Additional papers
have o¤ered some arguments about how investment requirements can play a role
in franchise contracts. Klein (1980, 1995) considers that investment requirement
can a¤ect the franchisees e¤ort through self-enforcement, because the franchisee
can lose some of its investments in case of termination. Klein (1980) puts emphasis
on how non-salvageable value of the assets that compose the investment require-
ments plays a role in self-enforcement, while Klein (1995) puts emphasis on how
the future earnings that investment requirements can generate, which are lost in
case of a contract termination, play a role in a self-enforcement mechanism. Dnes
(1993) adapted Williamsons analysis of transaction costs to empirically study the
role that the asset specicity of investment requirements plays on franchise con-
tracts. Through a case study of 15 franchise contracts in the United Kingdom,
he argues that the specicity of investment requirements plays a role in generat-
ing some termination covenants. In Klein (1980, 1995) and Dnes (1993) analyses,
however, investment requirement is not considered a decision variable. Investment
requirements is considered just as a channel through which asset specicity and
future earnings play a role in generating new contract covenants and boosting the
franchisees e¤ort through self-enforcement. The present essay adds to the liter-
ature by being the rst to explicitly model the franchisors choice of investment
requirements and exploring what its determinants are.
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Outside of the franchise literature, the present model shares similarities with
an employee posting a bond to his employer, which is recovered if he does not
shirk (see Shapiro and Stiglitz 1984).4 This mechanism was argued not to work
in an employer/employee relationship as presumably the employee does not have
enough initial wealth to post the bond in the rst place. In a franchise setting,
however, this mechanism is more plausible, as potential franchisees are expected
to invest in opening a franchise unit and the franchisor just modies investment
requirements on the margin in order to generate better enforceability conditions.5
The results presented here highlight that investment requirements are endoge-
nously determined. It is shown that investment requirements can be adjusted on
the margin to generate better enforceability conditions. The academic and prac-
tical importance of these results, for understanding the economics of franchise
contracts, is substantially enhanced by the size of the investment requirements.
To put it in context, investment requirements are, on average, more than 15 times
higher than initial franchise fees.
The rest of the essay is organized as follows. In section II.2, the general struc-
ture of the model is outlined and its placement in the literature is explained. In
section II.3, the model is presented and solved. In section II.4 we study how
investment requirements are a¤ected by the strengh of law enforcement and mon-
itoring costs. In section II.5, we extend the comparative statics to analyze initial
4This mechanism is an extension of the e¢ ciency wage model proposed by the same authors.
5In theory, the franchisor could ask the franchisee to post a bond with her rather than incur-
ring in a costly overinvestment to improve the enforceability conditions. However, in practice,
this would generate incentives for the franchisor to refrain returning the bond even if the fran-
chisee has behaved according to her specications. This, in turn, would make termination even
harder as the courts would anticipate the franchisors perverse incentives, backring on the
franchisors e¤orts to improve the self-enforceability of the contracts.
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franchise fees. Finally, conclusions are given in section II.6.
II.2-General Structure of the Model
In franchise contracts, incentives of the franchisor and their franchisees do not
always coincide even if the franchisees are the residual claimers of the franchisors
business, because franchisees can free-ride on a common brand name.6 As Klein
(1995) points out . . .when franchisees use a common brand name, each franchisee
can reduce its costs by reducing the quality of the product it supplies without bearing
the full consequences of doing so. Because a reduction in quality has the e¤ect of
reducing the future demand facing all franchisees using the common name, not
just the future demand facing the individual franchisee who has reduced quality,
the incentives for individual franchisees to supply the desired level of quality is
reduced (pp. 12-13).
In our setting, we will treat what Klein (1995) calls qualitymore broadly.
We will dene quality as sales e¤ort, which is the e¤ort the franchisee exerts to
operate the franchise unit according to the terms agreed upon in the franchise
contract with the franchisor. Within the sales e¤ort, we are considering several
dimensions of distribution services, like ambiance, product assortment, maintain-
ing a certain level of customer service and maintaining a standardized level of
6Klein (1995) points out three other reasons of why incentives might be misaligned. First,
franchisees can free-ride on pre-purchase services that can be obtained free from other fran-
chisees. Second, franchisors and franchisees can disagree in the optimal amount of marketing
e¤ort. Finally, franchisees can sell the franchisors products at a high markup if they have some
monopoly power, creating a double marginalization problem. In contrast with franchising on a
common brand name, none of these situations are present in all franchise contracts. However,
the rst two situations are captured by our model, given that they translate into franchisees
under providing sales e¤ort.
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quality for the products sold.7 We assume these terms can be contracted on, but
their observability is imperfect. The franchisor relies on inspections as a moni-
toring device to detect, with some probability, any underprovision of sales e¤ort
of franchisees. The idea of the optimal contract is that the franchisor uses the
investment requirements she asks franchisees to generate a self-enforcement mech-
anism. This mechanism is essential for the franchisor since the value of his brand
relies heavily on maintaining a uniform level of distribution services. In short, the
main assumptions of the model are that investment requirements are perfectly
observable, while sales e¤orts are not.8
The idea that investment requirements in franchise contracts can be used as
a tool for self-enforcement is not new. Klein (1980) states that if a franchisees
investment is highly specic, the non-salvageable investment can act as a collat-
eral bond,because if the franchisee cheats (i.e., under-provide sales e¤ort) and is
caught, he is left almost empty-handed, given that the resale price of the assets in
which he invested to run the franchise unit diminishes with their specicity. Klein
(1995) additionally states that investment increases the ongoing value of the re-
lationship, no matter who pays for the investment. In sum, higher investment
increases the value of staying in the relationship but also alters the value of cheat-
ing since it a¤ects the residual value of investment for any given asset specicity.
We will add these two ingredients to our model.9 The main di¤erence between
Kleins papers and the present model is that in Kleins papers the investment level
is xed, while here it can modied to generate better enforceability conditions.
7For a broader denition of distribution services see Betancourt (2004).
8The franchisor is closely involved in the installation of a new franchisee, so he can enforce
the investment requirements specications.
9Dnes (2003) provides a similar argument regarding the dual role of investments.
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The future prots and the outside option of the franchisee are not the only
components of the self-enforcement mechanism. As pointed out by Lafontaine and
Raynaud (2002), self-enforcement also depends on the franchisors monitoring and
her ability to terminate the franchise contract.
The monitoring frequency is endogenously determined by the franchisor. To
focus on the investment decision and keep the model tractable, we assume that
there are only two possible monitoring intensities, high and low, such that the
franchisors decision on monitoring intensity depends solely on the cost di¤erence
of these two available options. In this fashion, a direct mapping between monitor-
ing costs and monitoring intensities allow us to study the e¤ect that monitoring
costs has on investment requirements through its e¤ect on monitoring intensities.
On the other hand, the franchisors ability to terminate the franchise contract
is naturally exogenous, because it depends on the legal framework under which
franchises operate. We will dene weaker law enforcement when it is harder to
terminate a franchise agreement in which the franchisee has clearly under-provided
sales e¤ort. We assume that if a franchisor ends a relationship, there will be a
monetary loss for both the franchisor and the franchisee. The franchisor might
be willing to undertake this loss because if he does not commit to terminate an
underperforming franchisee, then no franchisee will exert the appropriate level
of sales e¤ort.10 We analyze the e¤ect of law enforcement on the investment
requirement.
We assume that the franchisors actions, such as giving ongoing support to
10In reality, monitoring intensity can also be a¤ected by the strength of the law enforcement.
We rule out this possibility in our model by only having two possible monitoring intensities.
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the franchisees, have no incidence on the franchisees demand. Allowing this
additional feature will turn the model into a double moral hazard problem as
the franchisor could also refrain to exert the appropriate level of e¤ort in her
actions. Not modeling the franchisors moral hazard problem can be considered
an important omission as Lal (1990), Battacharyya and Lafontaine (1995) showed
that this feature is the main justication for the existence of a positive royalty
rate.11 The intuition is that only a positive royalty rate gives the franchisor an
interest in the revenues of the franchisees. We do not model the franchisors
opportunistic behavior for mathematical tractability.12 We focus our attention
on the determinants of investment requirements, not considering the potential
e¤ects these determinants might have on the royalty rate. If the franchisors moral
hazard problem is modeled, changes in the model exogenous parameters would
have two margins of adjustment, royalty rates and investment requirements, rather
than just investment requirements. Therefore, its inclusion would only alter the
magnitude of the e¤ect of the exogenous parameters on investment requirements,
not the sign of the e¤ect.
We also assume that franchisors cannot end (or threaten to end) franchise
agreements opportunistically, that is, without a good cause for termination. In
other words, we assume that the franchisor does not try to end a relationship
to take over a protable franchisee or threaten to end a protable franchisee in
order to renegotiate the contract terms in its favor. We think this is a reasonable
11There are two alternative mechanisms that can generate positive royalty rates: franchisees
risk aversion and franchisees limited liability. The former has not found empirical support in
the literature (see Lafontaine and Slade (2007)), while the latter does not give any prediction
about what the determinants of royalty rates are.
12The comparative statics will be based on a Hessian rather than on an implicit equation.
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assumption for two reasons. First, unfairly terminating a franchise agreement
would hurt the franchisors reputation. Second, Lafontaine and Shaw (2005) found
that franchisors target a stable percentage of owned outlets in the long run (after
7 years of operation); therefore, when the franchise gets established no pattern of
ownership redirection is observed.
Finally, we leave aside other non pecuniary clauses of franchise contracts that
can a¤ect self-enforcement, like exclusive territories (see Klein and Murphy 1988),
or the e¤ect that asset specicity might have on contract length or other specic
clauses as discussed by Williamson (1975, 1979, 1985).
II.3-The Model
II.3.1-Specic Assumptions
We assume there areN identical franchisees and one franchisor. The franchisor
and the franchisees are risk neutral.13 We assume that the franchiseesdemand is
qi(pi; Ii; Ŝ)+"i; where pi is the price of the good sold, Ii 2 [0;1) is the investment
requirement, Ŝ is a compound of the rms sales e¤ort and the other franchisees
sales e¤orts and "i is a white noise random shock in the realization of the demand.
We assume that the price is xed at pi = 1; for simplicity, although relaxing
this assumption does not change the results of the model.14 Ŝ = (1   )Si +
13LaFontaine and Slade (1997, 2007) document that there is no evidence in favor of the
hypothesis that franchisees risk aversion plays an important role in the design of franchise
contracts.
14Allowing a franchisee to choose price in the model increases the marginal benets the fran-
chisee obtains from selling an additional unit, because the franchisee can also adjust the price
optimally. As a consequence, the marginal benet of exerting sales e¤ort increases when the
franchisee can chose the price, and this implies that more will be lost in case of contract termi-






N 1 ; where Si 2 [0;1) represents the franchisees own sales e¤ort, S i 2
[0;1) represents the sales e¤ort of other franchisees and the parameter  2 [0; 1]
is a measure of the magnitude of the externality. We assume this specication
so that changes in  alter only the composition of sales e¤orts on demand, not
its magnitude. The demand has a random shock component "i  N(0; 2). This
term is needed because without it the franchisor could infer the sales e¤ort from














= 0: These derivatives represent that investment and sales e¤ort
increase demand and that there are no complementarities between sales e¤ort and
investment.15 The assumption that the second derivatives of demand with respect
to investment requirements and sales e¤ort are zero was chosen for simplicity, but
all the results of the model still hold if we assume they are negative.
We assume that the marginal cost of producing qi is constant and equal to
zero, without loss of generality. Let (Ii) be the cost of investment and C(S) be
the cost of sales e¤ort. Both are assumed to be increasing and convex and satisfy
(0) = 0(0) = C(0) = C 0(0) = 0 to guarantee an interior solution.16 Let  be
xed price model we develop above is equivalent to a reduced-form model of the true underlying
phenomenon where the price can be optimally adjusted.
15Investment and sales e¤ort can be considered complements. In the case of a franchise
restaurant, higher investment can imply a better ambiance or better kitchen appliances. These
features makes selling easier, increasing the marginal benet of sales e¤ort. If this were the case,
investment would facilitate self-enforcement not only due to an increased punishment in case of
termination, but also by increasing the marginal benet of sales e¤ort directly. As a consequence,
complementarities between sales e¤ort and investment requirements only strengthen the role of
investment requirements as a self-enforcing device.
16Investment costs are convex for 2 reasons: First, mathematically they help to satisfy the
global concavity assumptions of the model. Second, intuitively, when franchisees with limited
initial wealth ask for a loan, they are charged higher interest rates the higher the amount they
ask, given that the risk of the loan increases. Therefore, the net present value of obtaining the
nancing increases in a convex fashion. If we want to be more precise, the costs of funding
would be better expressed as I + g(r(I)) where g(:) is a function of the NPV of the cost of the
interest paid over the loan which is an increasing function of the interest rate, which is in turn
an increasing function of the investment. Strictly speaking, the cost of the investment needs to
14
the royalty and f the initial franchise fee. Each franchisee is assumed to have an
outside option of U: Let fe be prots of the franchisee and fr prots of the
franchisor. Initially, assume there is no monitoring mechanism.
The timing of the model is as follows. At time 1, the franchisor chooses f; I
and : At time 2, the franchisees observes f; I and  and chooses the sales e¤ort,
Si: Prots are realized at t = 2: In this setting, prots represent the future stream
of prots generated in the franchise agreement.
II.3.2-No Monitoring Technology and First Best
Initially, consider a model without a monitoring mechanism: Si cannot be
observed by the franchisor.







= (1  )qi(Ii; Ŝ)  C(Si)  (Ii)  f
Assume that the franchisors objective function includes a reputation cost if









is a function of the
underprovision of sales e¤ort and  is a scalar that represents the severity of the
loss in reputation. We assume that  is positive and large to represent that the
future reputation of the franchisor has a big weight in his objective function. Let




with respect to sales e¤ort be  '0(S   Si) < 0
and the second derivative be '00(S   Si) > 0: This specication reects that the
be convex only for the relevant range. It can be at for small values of investment (i.e: amounts
that the franchisee can pay in cash).
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cost of reputation increases at an increasing rate with the underprovision of sales
e¤ort.17 Strictly speaking, the reputation cost is the loss of future reputational
rents.18 When a franchisor cannot maintain a high level of sales e¤ort from her
actual franchisees, future franchisees that choose to contract with the franchisor
will have their demand reduced and this, in turn, reduces the rents the franchisor
can extract from those future franchisees.
















Individual Rationality constrainti 8i
Best Response functioni 8i
The franchisor incorporates each franchisees best response function at t = 2
and their individual rationality constraints. The franchisees best response func-
tion is the franchisees rst order condition of prots with respect to sales e¤ort,
in a symmetric equilibrium. The individual rationally is the constraint that a
franchisees gets, in expectation, at least as much as what he would have obtained
17A reputation cost is needed because, in absence of it, when a franchisee is underproviding
sales e¤ort, the franchisor will not use investment requirements to overcome this problem. As
the marginal cost of investment is increasing, the franchisee needs to be compensated through a
lower franchise fee for additional investment requirements. In this scenario, the franchisor allows
the underprovision of sales e¤ort rather than asking for a smaller franchise fee. On the other
hand, when there is a reputation cost, the cost of underproviding sales e¤ort is large. Therefore,
the franchisor prefers to ask for a higher investment requirement even if this implies obtaining
a reduced franchise fee.
18Another way to incorporate the feature that franchisors want to avoid large under provisions
of sales e¤orts from franchisees is to add the franchisors reputational cost inside the demand
of the franchisees, rather than having a cost that captures the loss in future business as it is
modeled here. This last approach was chosen because it simplies the model and because it
provides a clean separation between the externality problem and the reputational concerns.
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from his outside option.
In this scenario, the rst best is obtained by maximizing the sum the prots
of the franchisees and the franchisor. Notice that in this scenario, by denition,
Si =
S, implying that the reputation cost is zero. The rst best optimization






qi(Ii; Ŝ)  C(Si)  (Ii)

Taking the rst order conditions with respect to investment and sales, and













= 0; equation (1) uniquely determines the rst best
investment requirement that a franchisor asks a franchisee, IFB; and equation (2)
uniquely determines the rst best level of sales e¤ort that a franchisee should
exert, SFB:
Without a monitoring technology, this equilibrium will not be achieved due to
the externality problem. Absent monitoring, the franchisee, in period 2, chooses
Si to maximize his objective function obtaining:
(1  )@qi(Ii; Ŝ)
@Si
= (1  )@qi(Ii; Ŝ)
@Ŝ
(1  ) = C 0(Si) (3)
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By symmetry Si = S i = S: Thus, equation (3) can be expressed as:19
(1  )@q(I; Ŝ)
@Ŝ
(1  ) = C 0(S) (4)
According to equation (4) sales e¤ort does not depend on the investment re-
quirement. This is because we do not have a monitoring mechanism that can
create the threat of termination and cause self-enforcement. Additionally, even
without solving the franchisors optimization problem we can see that the only
way the franchisor can a¤ect the franchisees sales e¤ort is through the royalty
rate. The lower royalty rate, the higher the sales e¤ort is. However, even when
royalty is set to be equal to zero, there is an underprovision of sales e¤ort given
that each franchisee considers the marginal benet of their own sales e¤ort and
not the benet their sales e¤ort has on the others franchisees. The higher the
externality , the more severe the underprovision of sales e¤ort is. Therefore, the
franchisor needs a method to boost sales e¤ort.
II.3.3-Monitoring Mechanism
The probability of detecting a franchisee underproviding sales e¤ort has two
components: the monitoring intensity, which is how often a franchisor inspects a
franchisee, and the franchisors ability to detect an underprovision of sales e¤ort
during an inspection.
The monitoring intensity is endogenously chosen by the franchisor. Given that
19The fact that each franchisees sales e¤ort does not depend on the others franchisees sales





the model only has two periods, the monitoring intensity represents the probability
of being monitored. Let  be the monitoring intensity which can be either high,
H ; or low L; and they satisfy 0 < L < H < 1: Let  be the monitoring cost.
Without loss of generality let L = 0 and H > 0:We only allow for two intensities
in order to keep the model tractable.20 Initially, we assume that H is small such
that it is always protable for the franchisor to monitor more intensively, H ; for
any investment requirement and sales e¤ort. Later, we study the consequences of
an increase in monitoring costs.
Even if the franchisor inspects the franchisee and the franchisee is underpro-
viding sales e¤ort, it can still be the case that the underprovision is not perceived
because the underprovision is small and can go unnoticed, or because an error
of assessment. Therefore, we assume there is only a probability of detecting un-
derprovision of sales e¤ort when there is underprovision. Let the probability of
detecting underprovision during an inspection be F ( S Si), where F ( S Si) > 0
8Si < S and F ( S   Si) = 0 8Si  S: For 8Si  S we assume that higher sales
e¤ort makes detection of an underprovision less likely,  f( S   Si)  0; and that
higher sales e¤ort decreases this probability at a decreasing rate, f 0( S   Si) < 0:
Further, we assume that f(0) = 0 and f 00( S   Si) = 0: The intuition for this
specication is that during an inspection, if the underprovision of sales e¤ort is
small it is harder to detect it than when it is large.
Putting together the monitoring intensity and the probability that the fran-
chisor detects an underprovision of sales e¤ort, when there is one, during an
inspection, we get the ex-ante probability of detecting an underprovision of sales
20If we allow the monitoring intensity to be a continuous variable the comparative statics will
be based on Hessians rather than single equations.
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e¤ort: F ( S   Si): This monitoring mechanism expresses the contractibility of
imperfectly observed sales e¤ort. The timing of the game is as follows: The fran-
chisor selects the monitoring intensity at t = 1 along with f;  and I; and the
franchisees, observing those decisions, simoultaneosuly select their sales e¤orts at
t = 2:
We assume that if the franchisor nds a franchisee underproviding sales e¤ort
she would like to sanction the franchisee by terminating the franchise contract.
Nevertheless, if the law enforcement under which they operate is weak it might
be di¢ cult to impose this sanction. Let  2 [0; 1] be the probability of terminat-
ing the franchise contract when an underprovision has been detected. A higher
 means stronger law enforcement. Therefore, the probability of terminating a
franchise contract can be expressed as F ( S   Si):21
We assume that if a franchisee is found cheating the franchise relationship will
be terminated and the franchisee will only have access to the salvage value of
his investment: (1  ) I: Let  2 [0; 1] be the degree of asset specicity;  = 1
means complete specicity and  = 0 means complete generality.22
21The probability of termination/nonrenewal has been quantied in the franchise literature.
Dnes (2003) surveyed 57 franchisors in the United Kingdom nding that 58% of them declared to
have used anticipated termination as a control device when observing misbehaving franchisees.
Additionally, 5% if the franchisors responded that they have not renewed a franchise agreement
for the same reasons. In the United States, Blair and Lafontaine (2005) using USDOC (1988)
data, provide evidence that in 1986, 3% of the 246,664 franchised outlets in operation in the
United States were terminated in anticipation. This rate is consistent with Williams (1996)
nding of a 15.7% of contract termination for a four-year period for 1,001 contracts analyzed.
Blair and Lafontaine (2004) further document that around 40% of the anticipated contract
terminations were propitiated by franchisors.
22Allowing for the possibility that the franchisee can sell the franchise to other potential
franchisees pre-selected by the franchisor would lead to the same conclusions. In that case,
specicity plays the role of limiting the number of potential buyers, reducing the resale value of
the franchise. Other types of penalties such as non-renewal of the agreement or the franchisors
encroachment of the franchisees territory have similar implications as contract termination.
These penalties reduce the prots of the franchisee in case of misbehavior, so they can also act
as self-enforcing devices.
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F ( S   Si)

(1  )Ii   C(Si)  (Ii)  f
The rst order condition is:
(1 )
"
qi(Ii; Ŝ)f( S   Si)+
@qi(Ii;Ŝ)
@Ŝ
(1  )(1  F ( S   Si))
#
 f( S Si)(1 )Ii = C 0(Si) (5)




N 1 = S: Thus, we can
dispense the subindex i from investment and demand.
Manipulating terms we obtain:
(1  )
24 q(I; Ŝ)  (1 )I(1 )  f( S   S)+
@q(I;Ŝ)
@Ŝ
(1  )(1  F ( S   S))
35 = C 0(S) (6)
For the monitoring technology to be useful it should increase the sales e¤ort
relative to the no monitoring scenario. This will happen if the marginal benet
of sales e¤ort in equation (6) is higher than the marginal benet of sales e¤ort in
equation (4) (without monitoring technology). This condition holds if:
f( S   S)








We assume the monitoring technology satises this criterion. The intuition is
that the marginal e¤ect of the monitoring technology, f( S Si); is strong enough
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so that the marginal benets of increasing sales e¤ort are big in comparison to
the expected losses from ending the relationship and losing prots. If F ( S S) is
large relative to f( S   Si) the franchisee will end up exerting a lower sales e¤ort
than in the no-monitoring case since he will anticipate that his e¤orts will be in
vain with a high probability.
We also assume that using the monitoring technology is protable for the
franchisor: the boost the monitoring technology generates in sales e¤ort exceeds
the expected losses from ending the agreement and the monitoring cost : In other
words, we are using the assumption that the reputation cost is large. Finally, we
assume that the monitoring technology is e¤ective in controlling the externality.
In equilibrium, S is below, but near, the desired S:
II.3.4-Solving the Model
The model is solved by backwards induction. Solving at t = 2; we obtain
equation (5), the reaction function of the franchisee. Applying the implicit func-
tion theorem to this equation it can be shown that franchiseessales e¤orts are
strategic complements: dSi
dSj
> 0. The intuition is that the higher the sales e¤ort
of the other franchisees, the higher the demand is, and thus it is more costly for
the franchisee to lose prots, which in turn motivates them to exert a higher sales
e¤ort. Recall that using symmetry we can obtain equation (6). Here, we will
write equation (6) in a more general way as:
(S;
; ; I) = 0 (8)
Equation (8) represents the behavior of each franchisee in equilibrium at t =
22
2; 
 represents all the parameters in the model, from the point of view of the
franchisee, besides  and I.



























The loss in the franchisorsprots due to the termination of a contract is cap-
tured by the probability of termination: F ( S Si)H:Only in the nontermination
scenarios does the franchisor perceive the fraction  of the franchisees revenues.
Franchisees are symmetric, implying that Ŝ = Si = S: This, in turn, implies that
the outside summation can be simplied into just N : Recall that we are initially
assuming that the costs of monitoring at high intensity are low, implying that
the franchisor always decides to monitor with high intensity. Thus, the franchisor
only needs to choose ; I and f: Replacing the individual rationality constraint,
which is binding through the appropriate choice of f , in the franchisors objective
function further reduces the choice variables to: I; : Moreover, we can incorpo-
rate (S;
; ; I) = 0 in the objective function by using the notation S(I; ;
):
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Since it is assumed that there is no moral hazard problem for the franchisor, the
optimal royalty rate will be zero. This is shown in Appendix A. All the conclusions
of the model are invariant to the inclusion of a royalty rate. The only variable left
in the franchisors optimization problem is the investment requirement.
II.4-Comparative statics
Our main goal is to analyze the e¤ect on the investment requirement of an
increase in the monitoring costs, H ; and weaker law enforcement, measured as
a decrease in . We study the e¤ect of these two parameters on investment
requirements rather than studying the e¤ect of all the model parameters on the
investment requirements because only the predictions from these two parameters
are empirically testable using the available franchise data sources.23 This is of
great relevance, as in the next essay we attempt to empirically test the predictions
generated by this model.
To begin, we analyze the e¤ect of a change in any parameter in 
 on the
investment requirement. Our starting point is the rst order condition of the
franchisor with respect to investment. We can write this rst order condition in
23For instance, in the available data sources there is no decomposition of investment in order
to assess how specic it is. In addition, any variable that can be used to measure the franchise
externality, such as the number of outlets the franchisors operate or the franchisors experience
also captures the franchise brand-name value, which in turn a¤ects the level of the franchisees
demand. Thus, externality and franchisors brand-name value cannot be told apart.
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)) = 0 (9)
Total di¤erentiation of equation (9) with respect to 
 and algebraically ma-





























: In Appendix B it is derived that @S

@I
> 0: Intuitively, for sales e¤orts
to increase with investment requirements it has to be the case that the marginal
net benet of exerting sales e¤orts for the franchisees increases when investment











  (1   ))f( S   Si)H; where f( S   Si) is the marginal decrease in the
probability of termination that an increase in sales e¤ort generates, and ( qi(I;Ŝ)
@I
 
(1 )) are the extra ex-post rents that the franchisee avoids losing by increasing
sales e¤orts when investment requirements increase. Therefore, to the extent
that higher investment generates higher ex-post rents, the marginal net benet of
exerting sales e¤ort for the franchisees increases as the franchisees have more to
lose in case of contract termination. An increase in investment generates higher
ex-post rents if the increase in rents that investment generates, qi(I;Ŝ)
@I
; is greater
than the increase in residual value of the investment, 1  . The model assumes
that this is the case for two reasons. First, because in practice the costs of funds are
increasing in the amount invested, implying that for investments near the rst-
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best level the marginal benet of investment, qi(I;Ŝ)
@I
; is higher than its residual
value, even when assets are completely general. This can be seen in equation (1),
as qi(I;Ŝ)
@I
= 0(I) > 1 > 1    . Second, because in practice the assets in which a
franchisee invests are highly specic:  is not small.
From the second order condition of the franchisors problem we know that the
marginal net benet of investment for the franchisor decreases with investment:
@!
@I
< 0: Then, to get the sign of the denominator of equation (10), we need to
derive the sign of @!
@S
. That is, how does the marginal net benet of investment for
the franchisor changes with a change in sales e¤ort. In Appendix C we show that
if the reputation cost, ; is positive and large, then @!
@S
< 0: The interpretation of
@!
@S
< 0 is that the higher the sales e¤ort, the lower the marginal net benet of
asking for a large investment requirement. When sales e¤ort is near the desired
S; the loss in reputation is small, given the convex cost of reputation, and using
investment as a mechanism to increase the franchisees benets from not under-
providing sales e¤ort is not protable given that the franchisor has to compensate
the franchisee for his costly investment through a reduction in the initial franchise
fee. On the other hand, when the sales e¤ort is far below the desired S; the loss
in reputation is large, given the convex cost of reputation, and given that  is
large this loss in reputation diminishes heavily the franchisors prots. Therefore,
the marginal net benet of investment requirements is large since it disciplines
franchisees and reduces the large loss in reputation for the franchisor. In other
words, the franchisor is willing to bear the cost of the negative net present value of







< 0 and @!
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The e¤ect of any parameter change on the investment can be decomposed









: The indirect e¤ect holds more economic meaning because
it refers to how a change in the parameter a¤ects sales e¤ort and how sales e¤ort
a¤ects the incentives of the franchisor to ask for investment requirements. The
intuition of the model can be summarized as follows: if some parameter diminishes




< 0; then the marginal net benet of
asking for higher investment requirements increases given that @!
@S
< 0: In other
words, the franchisor sets investment to avoid a big loss in reputation.24
II.4.1-Law Enforcement

















In Appendix D we show that the direct e¤ect of stronger law enforcement on
the marginal net benet of investment, @!
@
; is negative. The intuition is that the
24If franchisees are initially assymetric in terms of size this will still be the case as the overin-
vestment to avoid a reputational loss will occur irrespective of the initial size of the franchisees.
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stronger the law enforcement, the higher the probability of termination is, reducing
the marginal net benet of asking for high investment requirements as more is lost




> 0: The intuition is that the expected punishment for
misbehaving franchisees is larger when the probability of terminating a franchise
contract is higher. This, in turn, increases the franchisees incentives to exert a



















An increase in the probability of being able to end the franchise agreement,
provided that underprovision of sales e¤ort has been observed, decreases the in-
vestment requirement. The intuition is that stronger law enforcement increases
the sales e¤ort of franchisees. This, in turn, decreases the marginal net benet to
the franchisor of requiring high levels of investment.
We thus generate the following implication:
Hypothesis 1: Franchisors ask for lower (higher) investment requirements
when law enforcement is stronger (weaker).
25The direct e¤ect is expected to be small. If the franchisor is e¤ective in controlling the
franchiseessales e¤ort to maintain her reputation, the probability of nding a franchisee un-
derproviding sales e¤ort when he under provides it is low, so the increase in the probability
of termination conditional on a detected misbehavior is low as well. The direct e¤ect cannot
drive the comparative static on its own right, that is, without the presence of the indirect e¤ect
that correct sales e¤ort. If the comparative statics were driven solely by the direct e¤ect, the
franchisor would ask for higher investments to franchisees that she knows are more prone to un-
derprovide sales e¤ort. In equilibrium, bigger franchisees, in terms of investment requirements,




So far we have assumed that the cost of monitoring intensively, H ; is so small
that the franchisor always prefers the high monitoring intensity to the low moni-
toring intensity. Now, let us assume that the cost of monitoring intensity increases
and it is no longer protable for the franchisor to monitor with high frequency.
This might be the case of a franchisor that has broadened his geographical scope
of operations. In this scenario, maintaining a high monitoring frequency is only
possible at a very high cost. As a consequence, the franchisor optimally monitors
less often, choosing L: Thus, the e¤ect of an increase in the monitoring costs is
exactly the same of weaker law enforcement, because when monitoring costs are
high, monitoring intensity will diminish. When monitoring intensity is lower, the
expected punishment of a misbehaving franchisee is reduced and its sales e¤ort is
hindered. As a consequence the franchisor increases the investment requirements
in order to o¤set this underprovision.
We thus generate the following implication:
Hypothesis 2: Franchisors ask for higher (lower) investment requirements
when monitoring costs are higher (lower).
II.5-Extension: Initial Franchise Fee
Although the focus of the model is to analyze how law enforcement and moni-
toring costs a¤ect investment requirements, the model can also generate compar-
ative statics for the initial franchise fee. The initial franchise fee is determined
residually from the individual rationality constraint. We now show that the model
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has ambiguous predictions concerning the e¤ect of a change in the strength of the
law enforcement, ; on the initial franchise fee. As a change in the monitoring
costs, ; has the opposite e¤ect as a change in ; it also has an ambiguous e¤ect
on initial franchise fee.
In Appendix F we derive that the e¤ect of a change in any parameter 
 on
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. The sign of the indirect e¤ect depends
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the o¤setting e¤ect, which is the o¤setting reaction of investment to that change





: Because the role of investment in this model is to o¤set the
initial change in sales e¤ort, the initial e¤ect is by denition as big as the o¤set-
ting e¤ect. If the value of reputation is large the o¤setting e¤ect can o¤set a large

















but the magnitude is expected to be small.
The e¤ect of law enforcement on sales e¤ort, @S
@
is positive, so the overall
indirect e¤ect is likely to be positive and small. The intuition of this term being
positive is that when the law enforcement is stronger, less opportunistic behavior
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occurs. Therefore, a higher franchise fee can be extracted. The direct e¤ect, on the
other hand, is negative, @
fr(:)
@
< 0. The intuition is that the higher the probability
of termination, the higher the losses of the franchisee, and the franchisor needs
to compensate the franchisee for those expected losses. Considering both the
direct and the indirect e¤ect together the impact of  on the initial franchise
fee is ambiguous. Thus, this is also true for the monitoring cost. Therefore, we
cannot derive concrete empirical predictions regarding how the strength of the
law enforcement and monitoring costs a¤ect initial franchise fees.
II.6-Conclusion
The theory presented here suggests that investment requirements in franchise
contracts could be partially determined by the franchisors ability to directly mon-
itor her franchisees and enforce contract termination. The mechanism proposed
is that franchisors increase investment requirements when the franchiseesoppor-
tunities to free-ride on the franchisors brand-name, without being caught and
punished, are greater. The intuition is that higher investment requirements in-
crease franchiseesselling capacity; therefore, franchisees have more to lose in case
of termination. As a consequence, franchisees tend to avoid misbehaving when
investment requirements are higher.
We show that franchisors increase investment requirements when penalizing
a misbehaving franchisee is more di¢ cult (weaker law enforcement) and when
directly monitor a franchisee is more costly. These hipotheses are empirically
tested in the next essay.
The present results are novel because the investment requirements franchisors
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asks franchisees are shown to be able to play a unique role in self-enforcing fran-
chise contracts that was not documented in the literature. In addition, these
results are of high economic relevance as the average investment requirement a
franchisor asks a franchisee is quite large: it is over half a million dollars.
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CHAPTER III
Investment Requirements in Franchise Contracts as a
Self-Enforcing Device: Empirical Evidence
III.1-Introduction
Investment requirements in franchise contracts are the amount franchisors ask
franchisees to invest in the opening of a new franchise unit. It is commonly
thought that once the franchisors retailing format is dened, variations in the in-
vestment requirements depend exclusively on the market characteristics where a
franchise unit operates. On the rst essay of this dissertation an additional use for
investment requirements was proposed. Investment requirements were proposed
as a tool to discipline franchiseesbehavior. This theory provides two testable
implications. Franchisors ask for higher investment requirements when penaliz-
ing a misbehaving franchise is more di¢ cult (weaker law enforcement) and when
directly monitoring franchisees is more costly. This essay empirically evaluates
these theoretical predictions.
We measure weak law enforcement with the passing of state level good-cause
termination/nonrenewal laws, which weaken the franchisors ability to terminate/not-
renew a contract with an underperforming franchisee. These laws were passed in
14 states between 1971 and 1980 and in Iowa in 1992. We measure monitoring
costs using the number of states in which a franchisor operates. We use two
panel datasets to test our predictions. The unit of observation in both datasets
is a franchisor-year. The rst dataset consists of 278 franchisors that o¤ered
contracts to prospective franchisees both in 1979 and 1982 (556 franchisor-year
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observations). The main result from this dataset is that franchisors headquar-
tered in the states in which the good-cause laws were passed in 1980, California
(39 franchisors) and Illinois (21 franchisors), incrementally increased the aver-
age investment requirements asked to prospective franchisees by 4.7% relative to
franchisors located in states where there was no change in the law. The second
dataset is a large unbalanced panel dataset for the period 1994-2009. This dataset
contains yearly prospective contract information for 2,017 franchisors, totalizing
10,047 franchisor-year observations. As this dataset is posterior to the passing
of the laws it only allows us to analyze the between franchisor contract variation
according to the franchisorsstate regulation. It is found that franchisors located
in the states where good-cause laws were passed ask for investment requirements
4.5% higher than franchisors located in states without such laws. Additionally,
using both datasets we nd evidence that franchisors that expand their opera-
tions to an additional state increase the average investment requirements they
ask a prospective franchisee between 0.6-1%. This result is robust to the inclusion
of controls variables that capture the endogeneity of the expansion decision and
to the inclusion of additional variables that control for alternative explanations
other than the monitoring cost hypothesis.
Due to the lack of theoretical guidance regarding the determinants of invest-
ments requirements there was no previous attempt to empirically study this vari-
able. Empirical research in the franchise literature revolved around the study of
initial franchise fees, royalty rates (Lafontaine (1992), Sen (1993), Wimmer and
Garen (1997), Lafontaine and Shaw (1999), among others) and some other con-
tract terms such as area development agreements, mandatory advertisement ex-
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penditures, franchisees passive ownerships (Brickley (1999)) and contract length
(Brickley et al. (2006)).
This essay adds to existing literature in being the rst to empirically study the
determinants of investment requirements. As the empirical evidence presented in
this essay is in agreement with the theoretical predictions of a model in which
investment requirements are used as a tool to discipline franchisees, we conclude
that investment requirements are indeed used as a tool to discipline franchisees
behavior. Moreover, in the previous literature investment requirements are con-
sidered an exogenous explanatory variable, while the present paper shows that it
is an endogenous contract term.26
The rest of the essay is organized as follows. In section III.2 the empirical
strategy is described. In section III.3 the data is presented. Section III.4 presents
the empirical results. Finally, section III.5 concludes.
III.2-Empirical Strategy
In our empirical analysis we examine the e¤ect of law enforcement and moni-
toring costs on investment requirements. Investment requirement data, as well all
contract data, are available solely at the franchisor level.27 Franchisor level data
come from private and government surveys in which the franchisor is asked about
the contract terms that she will ask prospective franchisees. This type of data
also contains information on how many outlets a franchisor operates, in how many
26Betancourt (2004) was the rst to critique the use of investment requirements as an exoge-
nous variable in the empirical franchise literature, given its potential endogeneity. However, he
does not provide a theoretical model to guide what the determinants of investment requirements
are.
27With the exception of study cases such as Dnes (1993).
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states, where the franchisorsheadquarters is located as well as other franchisors
characteristics. It does not contain, however, the location of her franchise units or
the identity of the states where they operate. In what follows we explain how we
measure law enforcement and monitoring costs using data at the franchisor level
to empirically analyze their impact on investment requirements. Our measures
are based on previous works that have studied the e¤ects of law enforcement and
monitoring costs on royalty rates.
III.2.1-Law Enforcement
From 1971 to 1992, 15 states have passed good-cause termination/nonrenewal
laws.28 Good-cause laws are laws that restrict the franchisors ability to terminate
and not renew, a franchise agreement. These laws were passed because it was
feared that franchisors could use their bargaining power to unfairly terminate,
or threat to terminate, a franchise agreement in order to get back a protable
outlet or renegotiate contract terms in their favor. One consequence of these laws
is that it is more di¢ cult to control franchiseessales e¤ort because these laws
increase the costs of termination and non-renewal (Brickley et al 1991). Courts
ask for more detailed evidence about the cause of the termination/nonrenewal of
the franchise contracts. Arguments like "economic reasons" or that a franchisee
is not on "good standing" are not usually considered good causes (Brickley et al
1991). In our terminology, law enforcement is weakened with the passing of these
laws.
28From the 15 states that passed these laws, only Virginia has good-cause restrictions for
termination and does not have any restriction for nonrenewal. The other 14 states that passed a
good-cause law are Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Indiana, Illinois, Iowa,
Michigan, Minnesota, Nebraska, New Jersey, Washington and Wisconsin. Additional states have
passed milder termination restrictions, such us a 90- or 30-days notice upon termination.
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Brickley (2002) studies the e¤ect of termination laws on royalty rates using
data at the franchisor level. As this type of data does not contain information on
where each of the franchisees are located, Brickley (2002) measures the e¤ect of
the good-cause laws with a dummy that takes a value of one if the franchisors
headquarters is located in a good-cause law state and zero otherwise. The valid-
ity of using this dummy variable depends on whether good-cause laws apply to
a franchisor located in a good-cause law state, considering that franchisors can
operate in multiple states. There are two scenarios under which, if the franchisor
is located in a good-cause law state, the good-cause law is likely to inuence the
franchise contracts and one scenario where it is unlikely to inuence them. First, if
a franchisors headquarters is located in a good-cause law state and the franchisee
is located in the same state, the law is going to a¤ect the contract between the
two parties. This scenario is particularly important given that, between 32% to
46% of the franchisorsunits are located in the same state in which the franchisor
is located.29 Second, Brickley (2002) points out that "Franchisors headquartered
in a state without a termination law sometimes can avoid termination laws in
other states by contractually specifying that all litigation must take place in the
home state and under the law of the home state." (p. 520).30 Therefore, when a
franchisors headquarters is located in a good-cause law state, she cannot contract
around the law while a franchisor located in a state without a good-cause law po-
29In our main data we have information for the number of units a franchisor has in the three
states in which they operate more units. If these states happen to coincide with the state in
which the franchisor is headquartered, then we know what fraction of units that state represents
for each franchisor. Using these observations we obtain that 46% of the outlets are located in
the headquarters state, on average. This number represents an upper bound. Alternatively, if
we assume that the franchisor that does not has its headquarters state among the three states
with more outlets has zero outlets in it, we obtain a lower bound of 32%.
30See Klick et al. (2010) for the specic details when the rms can select the law and courts
of non-regulating states.
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tentially can. On the other hand, if the franchisee is located in a state without
a good-cause law the contract between the parties is unlikely to be a¤ected by
good-cause laws even if the franchisor is located in a good-cause law state. It is in
the best interest of the franchisor to be ruled by the franchiseesstate regulations,
in case the good-cause laws do not apply there. This last scenario adds noise to
the dummy that measures the e¤ect of good-cause laws.31
In sum, using a dummy variable based on the franchisors headquarters loca-
tion is a reasonable measure for the inuence of the good-cause laws on contract
terms since it captures the laws inuence when the franchisee is located in the
same state as the franchisor and when the franchisee is located in another good-
cause law state. The scenario in which a franchisee is located in a state without
a good-cause law adds noise to the dummy variable, weakening our empirical
analysis. We address the mismeasurement in two ways. First, we add as an ex-
planatory variable the interaction between the franchisorsheadquarters location
and the number of states in which they operate, as the passing of the law at
the franchisors headquarters state should have a lower impact on the average
investment requirements they ask franchisees when they operates in more states.
Second, in some of the regressions we will restrict the sample to franchisors that
only operate their units in their headquarters state.
31In practice, a franchisor cannot choose any state when she has choice of law. She can only
choose between the state where the franchisee is located and her headquarters state as there
needs to be substantial relationshipwith the designated state (see Klik et al. 2010 for details).
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III.2.2-Monitoring Costs
Rubin (1978) and Brickley and Dark (1987), among others, have pointed out
that the further away outlets are, the less frequently they will be monitored,
because monitoring costs are higher. This intuition was also shared by industry
experts.32 Lafontaine (1992) and Lafontaine and Shaw (1999) study the e¤ect of
monitoring costs on royalty rates using data at the franchisor level. As they do
not have information about the location of franchisees, they measure monitoring
costs using the number of states in which a franchisor operates.
In our setting, the number of states in which a franchisor operates is a valid
measure for monitoring costs only after controlling for the franchisors brand-
name, which can have a direct impact on investment requirements, and is likely
to be positively correlated with the number of states. Therefore, once one controls
for variables such as the number of outlets a franchisor operates and franchisors
experience, which a¤ect a franchisors brand-name value, the number of states in
which a franchisor operates is a good measure of monitoring costs.33
The mechanism by which the number of states in which a franchisor operates
a¤ects investment requirements asked to prospective franchisees is as follows. The
average investment requirement a franchisor asks a prospective franchisee is deter-
mined based on past experience and future expectations, and the number of states
in which a franchisor operates a¤ects both factors. When a franchisor increases
the number of states in which she operates, she adjusts the investment require-
ments she asks considering the amounts involved in the recent deals, which are
32Victor Dacarret, CEO franchising Chile.
33We consider several robustness checks to evaluate the validity of this measure.
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related to the latest geographic expansion. For example, a franchisor that used
to operate only in California and recently expanded her operations to Oregon
is going to update the investment requirements asked to prospective franchisees
considering the amounts involved in the contract she just signed with the new
franchisee located in Oregon. Additionally, the franchisor expects that new deals
are likely to occur in the market to which she has expanded. Thus, the average
investment requirement she asks prospective franchisees is likely to incorporate
the expectation of new openings in a broader geographical area. In the recent ex-
ample this translates as follows: the franchisor that has just expanded to Oregon
forecasts that, given the realization of an opening in Oregon, it is more likely that
new franchise units are going to be opened in that state. The higher probability
of new openings in Oregon a¤ects the average investment requirements she asks
prospective franchisees.
III.3-Data
We have two data sources: the Handbook of Franchise Opportunities (HFO)
and Bonds Franchise Guide (BFG). They both contain information about con-
tract terms that franchisors o¤er prospective franchisees.34 The HFO data main
advantage is that is older, so it allows us to study the within franchisor e¤ect of
the passing of the good-cause laws on investment requirements, at the time some
of the laws were passed. The BFG data main advantage is that it is much richer,
allowing us to perform robustness tests on our results. In what follows we describe
in detail the data available to us from each data source.
34Both datasets contain information about business format franchises only.
40
III.3.1-Bonds Franchise Guide
BFG is a private survey that started in 1993, issuing yearly editions, except for
the year 2000, when there was no survey. Since 1994 the dataset has a complete
computerized version. We have access to the computerized version of the data
for the period 1994-2009. As the good-cause laws were passed from 1971-1980
in 14 states, and in 1992 in Iowa, this dataset does not allows us to analyze the
within franchisor e¤ect of the passing of the good-cause laws on investment re-
quirements. However, it does allow us to study the long run e¤ect of the passing
of the good-cause laws. That is, we are able to analyze whether a franchisor whose
headquarters is located in a good-cause law state asks for investment requirements
higher than a franchisor located in a state without such laws. Additionally, this
dataset allows us to study the within-franchisor e¤ect of monitoring costs, mea-
sured by the number of states in which the franchisor operates, on investment
requirements. Moreover, given the richness of this dataset we are able to perform
several robustness tests using some variables reported in it.
We drop observations below the 1st percentile and above the 99th percentile
of franchisorsannual percentage change in investment requirements to avoid ob-
taining results driven by the presence of outliers.35 Our nal dataset consists of
10,047 franchisor-year observations. The number of franchisors in the sample is
2,017 and the average number of years a franchisor appears in the sample is ve.
Our panel is highly unbalanced for two reasons: franchisorsentry and exit; and
because franchisors do not always answer the survey. Table III.1 summarizes the
35These observations are likely to be misreports. The 1th percentile represents an 82% decrease
in the yearly investment requirement and the 99th percentile represents an increase of 200%.
Results still hold when including these observations.
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number of franchisors according to the number of years they appear in the sam-
ple. It shows that the number of franchisors decreases nonmonotonically with the
number of years they appear in the sample. For instance, while 494 franchisors
appeared only once in the sample just 61 of them appeared in all 15 years.
Table III.2 shows the summary statistics of the main variables we use in our
analysis. The main dependent variable of our analysis is the investment require-
ment a franchisor asks prospective franchisees, net of the initial franchise fee.36
Additional contract terms shown in Table III.2 are franchise fee and royalty rate.
Investment requirements and franchise fee are expressed in nominal thousands of
dollars, while royalty rate is expressed as a percentage of the franchisees revenues.
Whenever a franchisor asks for a range in any of these contract terms, we report
the average between the two points of the range. This implies that these contract
terms should be interpreted as the average contract terms a prospective franchisee
would face if he chooses to do business with the franchisor.
Table III.2 shows that while the mean investment requirement is $520,000 the
mean initial franchise fee is only $31,700, highlighting that the economic mag-
nitude of the investments requirements is quite large, relative to other contract
terms. There are 9,648 franchisor-year observations for the royalty rate, 399 obser-
vations less than for the other contract terms because some franchisors answered
in the survey that their royalty rate varied or was a xed monthly amount. Ad-
ditional variables included in Table III.2 are the number of outlets a franchisor
operates, the number of states in which they operate, the experience they have
franchising, measured as the number of years since they started franchising, and
36Franchise fee does not increase a franchisees demand, so it should not be considered as part




the dummy law, which takes a value of one if the franchisor is located in a state
that has passed a good-cause termination/nonrenewal law and zero otherwise.37
Thirty six percent of the franchisors are located in states that have passed good-
cause laws.
Finally, the bottom three rows of Table III.2 show the yearly within-franchisor
variation of investment requirements, expressed in percentage change; and the
yearly within-variation of the number of units and number of outlets, expressed
in simple di¤erences. Showing the yearly di¤erences is helpful since in some of the
econometric analyses we study within franchisorscontract variations. We express
the rst di¤erence of investment requirements in percentage rather than in simple
di¤erences to get a more accurate picture of this variable. As the magnitude of
investments requirements in di¤erent industries can be quite large, if measured
in simple di¤erences, the yearly change in investment would be driven mainly by
industries with big investment requirements, distorting the real picture. A fran-
chisor, conditional on staying in the sample, on average increases the investment
requirement she asks prospective franchisees by 4.3% a year, opens 18 new units
and expands her operations by "half" a state.
III.3.2-Handbook of Franchise Opportunities
The HFO data is a periodic survey that the Department of Commerce con-
ducts. It was issued yearly from 1972 to 1987, and afterwards it has been issued
irregularly. The main advantage of this data base is that it goes back to the period
37Alternatively, we could have measured experience as the number of years that a rm is in
business, rather than the number of years since it started franchising. Results are insensitive to
the way experience is dened.
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where some of the termination laws were passed, allowing us to study the within
franchisor e¤ect of the passing of the good-cause laws and number of states on
investment requirements. Nevertheless, it has several shortcomings. First, there
is no electronic version of this data, so it has to be hand-collected. Second, it does
not have as many variables as the BFG data base. It only contains information
on the number of states in which a franchisor operates, the number of outlets a
franchisor operates, the year the franchisor started his business  from which a
proxy for experience can be constructed and investment requirements. Third,
the way they report investment requirements, makes it a noisy measure of the
real variable. Rather than having separate information about the investment re-
quirements and the initial franchise fee, the HFO reports the sum of these two
variables.38 In addition, it is not clear whether they report the equity needed or
the total investment that is needed for opening a new franchise unit.
We hand-collected data for the years 1979 and 1982. We selected these two
years because in 1980 California and Illinois passed good-cause laws. These two
states are the states with biggest economic relevance, in terms of total income,
among the 15 states that passed these laws. This allows us to have many obser-
vations from which to derive our results, as many franchisors are headquartered
in California or Illinois. We collected data for 1982, rather than 1981, to allow
franchisors to adapt their contracts to the new economic environment, after the
passing of the law.
38Entrepreneur Magazines Franchising in the Economy has information about the capital a
franchisor needs to start a business, separate from the amount franchisors ask as a franchise
fee. This survey has yearly editions starting in 1980. As the information in this database
is presented with a one year lag, the 1980 edition actually contains information about 1979.
However, the question asked about capital requirements changed after the 1980 edition, making
the comparison between surveys unreliable.
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We address the HFO data shortcomings in two ways. First, we take advantage
of the richness of the BFG data. Using the BFG database we are able to show that
the control variables that are not available in the HFO database play no signi-
cant role in the estimations. Also, using the BFG data base, we show that when
the dependent variable is dened as investment requirements, including franchise
fees rather than just investment requirements net of initial franchise fees, the ef-
fect of the number of states and good-cause laws are biased downwards. Hence,
using this aggregate measure of investment requirements understates the e¤ect of
the explanatory variables of interest on the true dependent variable rather than
overstating it. This implies that the e¤ect of monitoring costs and weaker law
enforcement that it is found using the HFO database can be considered a lower
bound of the true e¤ect. Second, we carefully hand-collect the HFO data for
franchisors that have consistent data descriptions for both 1979 and 1982. When
it is not explicitly mentioned that the data represents total investment, meaning
it could represent equity investments, we only include the observations in which
the nancial terms remain unaltered in both periods. If it is the case that eq-
uity requirements is what is reported, when nancial terms remain unaltered the
percentage change in equity requirements is, on average, equivalent to a percent-
age change in total investment requirements. This adds noise to the dependent
variable, but does not bias the parameters on the explanatory variables.
Consistent with the procedure we use for the main sample, we drop observa-
tions below the 1st percentile and above the 99th percentile of franchisorsper-
centage change in investment requirements to avoid obtaining results driven by
the presence of outliers. The nal sample consists of 278 franchisors that did not
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change their headquarters location for the years 1979 and 1982. Table III.3 shows
the summary statistics of the HFO database. Investment is measured in nominal
thousands of dollars. The mean investment is $49,800. A franchisor, conditional
on staying in the sample, on average increases the investment requirement she
asks prospective franchisees by 33% in the three-year period; opens 60 new units
and expands her operations in 1.2 states.39 Out of the 278 franchisors, 39 are
located in California and 21 in Illinois, representing 21.5% of the franchisors in
the sample.
III.3.3-Sample Industry Composition
In both datasets there is a description of the industry to which each franchisor
belongs. The industry description is much richer in the BFG than in the HFO.
BFG provides 45 industries classications, while in the HFO database there are
only 9. Table III.4, panel A, shows the industry composition of the BFG data and
panel B shows the industry composition of the HFO data.
III.4-Results
In this section, we empirically examine the e¤ect of monitoring costs and law
enforcement on franchisorsinvestment requirements. First, using the HFO data-
base, we analyze franchisors investment requirements within variation. Then,
using the BFG database we analyze within industry variation of investment re-
quirements. Finally, we perform robustness tests using the BFG database and
39Considering franchisors that appear three consecutive years in the BFG database, the av-
erage percentage investment requirement change is only 19%. The bigger change in investment
requirements in the HFO database is likely to be attributable to di¤erences in the sample periods,





III.4.1-Main Results: HFODatabase within Franchisor Vari-
ation
The dependent variable is the logarithm of investment requirements. We use
logarithms rather than levels to avoid obtaining results driven by a few changes
in investment requirements from franchisors that ask for big amounts. The ex-
planatory variables are the number of states in which a franchisor operates, the
dummy law, the interaction between these last two terms and control variables.
We include the interaction between the dummy law and the number of states to
examine two competing e¤ects that might be at work. On the one hand, when
a franchisor expands to other states, the franchisor might be able to avoid his
in-state regulation.40 As a consequence, the e¤ect of the good-cause law in the
franchisors headquarters state would have less impact on the average investment
requirement she asks. Under this logic, the expected sign of the interaction term
is negative. On the other hand, it can be argued that higher monitoring costs
and weaker law enforcement could strengthen each others e¤ect on investment
requirements, since more extreme measures are needed to avoid franchiseesun-
derprovision of sales e¤ort. In this scenario, the interaction e¤ect is expected to
be of positive sign. For simplicity reasons, this last possibility was not considered
in the theoretical model. It was assumed that a change in monitoring costs di-
rectly maps into monitoring intensity, without interacting with the degree of law
40By 1980, besides California and Illinois, there were only 12 states that have passed good-
cause laws and 36 states that did not. Therefore, a franchisor operating in more states, on
average, has more chances of avoiding the in-state regulation by setting the litigation in the
franchisees state when possible.
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enforcement.41 If the reinforcement e¤ect is important empirically the theoretical
assumption would need to be revised.
We include franchisor xed e¤ects to examine franchisorswithin variation.
The identication of the e¤ect of the good-cause laws on investment requirement
is given by the two states that adopted good-cause laws in 1980: California and
Illinois. Equation (15) summarizes the specication described.
ln(Ifit) = +statesfit+Lawfit+(statesfitLawfit)+xfit+f+'t+"fit (15)
Where Ifit represents the investment requirement that franchisor f in industry
i at time t asks prospective franchisees; statesfit represents the number of states
in which franchisor f in industry i operates at time t; xfit are control variables; f
are franchisor xed e¤ects; and "fit is the error term. In this setting 't is dummy
variable that takes a value of 1 for 1982 and zero otherwise. This specication is
equivalent to a di¤erence-in-di¤erence estimation. We correct standard errors to
account for clustering at the industry level.
The control variables included are state controls, number of outlets, its quadratic
term and experience squared.42 We do not include experience alone as all fran-
chisors gain the same 3 years of experience in the 1979-1982 period, making ex-
perience perfectly collinear with the constant. Experience and number of outlets
are included to control for the franchisors brand-name value. The state controls
included are income per capita and population from the state in which the fran-
41Analyzing the interaction between these two e¤ects implies generating comparative statics
from a Hessian rather than a single equation. This complicates the model without providing
further insight.
42Number of outlets squared is included to control for franchisors that operate a particularly
large number of outlets.
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chisors headquarters is located. These state-level variables are included to control
for state-specic economic trends that might be related to changes in investments
requirements.
Table III.5, column I, shows the estimation of equation (15). Both theoretical
hypotheses nd support in the data. Monitoring costs and weaker law enforcement
increase investment requirements. The parameters of the variables number of
states and dummy law are 1.2% and 11.4%, respectively. Both parameters are
statistically signicant.
The interaction between the number of states and the change in the law is neg-
ative and insignicant, implying that the avoidance of in-state regulation dom-
inates any potential reinforcing e¤ect between weak law enforcement and high
monitoring costs. The fact that the reinforcement e¤ect is not empirically rele-
vant supports the simplifying theoretical assumption that monitoring costs maps
directly into monitoring intensity, without interacting with law enforcement.
The marginal e¤ects of the passing of the law and number of states, on in-
vestment requirements, considering the interaction term evaluated at the sample
means, are 4.7% and 1%, respectively. However, the impact of the passing of the
law evaluated for a franchisor that only operates in one state is much larger: 11%.
This is to be expected as a franchisor that operates only in one state which is
likely to be the franchisors headquarters state- cannot contract around the law.43
The standard errors reported in column I can be biased. While we correctly
cluster at the industry level, there are only 9 industry classications and the
43From BFG data we observe that 93% of the franchisors that operate units in one state
operate them in their headquarter state. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that if a franchisor
operates in one state, this state is her headquarters state.
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cluster-robust standard errors we compute assume that the number of clusters is
large enough to apply asymptotic properties in their computation. Cameron et
al (2008a), doing a Monte Carlo experiment for a data generating process with
small number of clusters, showed that the cluster-robust estimation gives under-
estimated standard errors. Therefore, there is a possibility that we are incorrectly
rejecting the null hypotheses that the parameters of number of states and the
dummy law are zero. Cameron et al. (2008a) propose asymptotic renements
that try to consistently compute the parameters true p-values when the number
of clusters in the sample is as small as 5. The asymptotic renement that showed
better performance was the wild cluster bootstrap-t. In this type of bootstrap the
resampling is over the residuals of the OLS estimation with the null hypothesis
imposed. In addition, the residuals drawn are multiplied by minus one and plus
one with 50% of probability. We performed this methodology for the parameters
of the variables number of states and dummy law. We obtain that the p-values are
virtually unchanged for the dummy law, remaining statistically signicant at the
1% level. For the number of states, the p-value increases. However, this variable
remains statistically signicant, now at the 10% level. Therefore, we nd empirical
support to both theoretical hypotheses even after correcting for the nite sample
problem in the computation of the parameters standard errors.
We modify equation (15) by including two dummy variables to account for the
passing of the good-cause laws, rather than one. We include a dummy variable
for the California change in the law and another for Illinois. We also include the
interaction of these dummies with the number of states. The purpose of this spec-
ication is to show that the results are not driven solely by one state. The results
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of this specication are shown in Table III.5, column II. The parameters that
accompany both California and Illinois good-cause laws are positive (10.8% and
11%, respectively), statistically di¤erent from zero, and not statistically di¤erent
from each other.
To sum up, it is shown that some of the within franchisors investment require-
ments variation is due to changes in their average monitoring costs and enforce-
ability conditions. Consistently with the theoretical predictions, franchisors ask
for higher investment requirements when the franchisees incentives to provide
the appropriate level of self-e¤ort are weaker (i.e., when good-cause laws apply
-weaker law enforcement- and when the franchisor operates in more states -higher
monitoring costs).44 ;45
44Notice, though, that franchisors can increase investment requirements not only to improve
self-enforcement conditions in franchise contracts, but also to improve the quality of franchisees
they want to attract. The intuition follows closely the logic of the theoretical model. Low
quality franchisees with intrinsically higher probability to under provide sales e¤ort will be
discouraged to sign a contract with the franchisor when they are asked for high initial invest-
ments, given that they have a high probability of being terminated. Although empirically we
cannot assess whether investment requirements increase to improve the enforceability conditions
within franchise contracts or to improve the quality of applicants, most likely both factors are
at work. Higher investments generate a permanent increase in earnings that would be lost in
case of termination. Under providing sales e¤ort and/or being of a cheating type increases the
probability of termination, thus sales e¤ort is increased endogenously and/or better franchisees
apply, reducing the under provision of sales e¤ort.
45Notice that even though there is an optimal adjustment through investment requirements
due to the passing of the laws, franchisors should still be worst o¤ because of the good-cause
laws as they increase investment requirements at the cost of losing potential franchisees or at
the cost of compensating franchisees for the extra investment they ask them to do. Brickley et
al (1991) show that franchisors are indeed worst-o¤ with the passing of the laws. They provide
evidence that franchisors located in California su¤ered a reduction in stock prices due to the
passing of the good-cause law in that state.
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III.4.2-Main Results: BFG Database within Industry Vari-
ation
Relative to the HFO database, the BFG database has the disadvantage of
covering a period of time posterior to the passing of the good-cause laws, 1994-
2009. This implies that we are unable to analyze the within franchisor e¤ect
of good-cause laws on investment requirements. However, we can analyze the
long-run e¤ects of the laws. We can study whether franchisors located in states
where these laws apply ask for higher investment than franchisors located in states
without such laws. The main drawback of this analysis is that if the franchisors
characteristics are correlated with their location we will obtain biased parameters.
We partially address this concern by controlling for industry xed e¤ects. This
specication is summarized in equation (16).
ln(Ifit) = +statesfit+Lawfit+(statesfitLawfit)+xfit+i+'t+"ijt (16)
The main di¤erence between equation (16) and equation (15) is that in equa-
tion (16) we replace franchisors xed e¤ects for industry xed e¤ects. Addition-
ally, now 't incorporates 14 time dummies rather than just one.
The most conservative clustering strategy is to correct standard errors by clus-
tering at the industry level (45 industry classications), given that franchisors are
nested within industry classications. This type of clustering captures the poten-
tial autocorrelation of the variables, which is especially relevant in long panels such
as this, and the common group component of the error term at the same time (see
Cameron et al. (2008b)).46 However, once one controls for industry xed e¤ects,
46See Bertrand et al (2004) for an example of policy autocorrelation in long panels.
57
if there is no suspicion of autocorrelation within industries, standard errors can
be corrected by clustering franchisor level as well. This method has the advantage
that the number of groups is large (2,017 franchisors), so there are few concerns
regarding whether the asymptotic properties used to compute the cluster-robust
standard errors apply. The results we present show standard errors corrected by
clustering at the industry level. However, when standard errors are corrected by
clustering at the franchisor level, they are reduced slightly. Therefore, the results
we are presenting are the most conservative between the two types of clustering
alternatives.
The BFG database has the advantage of reporting investment requirements
and initial franchise fees separately. This allows us to analyze the e¤ect of good-
cause laws and number of states on investment requirements, net of franchise
fees, and on total investment requirements. While investment requirements net of
franchise fees is our main variable of interest, analyzing the impact of the number
of states and good-cause laws on total investments is useful for comparison reasons,
as the results from Table III.5 were generated using total investments. Table III.6,
column I, shows the estimation of equation (16) using investment net of franchise
fees as dependent variable and column II shows the estimation of equation (16)
using total investment as dependent variable.
The results presented in Table III.6, column I, give support to both theoretical
predictions and are in agreement with the results found in Table III.5. The number
of states in which a franchisor operates, and operating in states where good-cause
laws have been passed, increase investment requirements in a statistically signi-
cant way. Also, consistent with the HFO database results, the interaction between
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number of states and the dummy law is negative. Considering the interaction term
evaluated at the sample means, the marginal e¤ects are the following. Franchisors,
within the same industry, ask for investment requirements 0.75% higher for every
additional state in which they operate. In addition, franchisors, within the same
industry, that operate in states where good-cause termination/non-renewal have
been passed ask for investment requirements 4.5% higher than franchisors oper-
ating in states without such laws.47 The parameters of the variables of interest
and the marginal e¤ects obtained here are very similar to the ones obtained using
HFO database, suggesting that the phenomenon that we are trying to document
is robust to di¤erent time periods and the use of franchisors xed e¤ects.48 ;49
The results using total investment as dependent variable column II are sim-
ilar to the results using investment net of franchise fee column I. More impor-
tantly, the parameters of number of states and dummy law are smaller when us-
ing when total investments, rather than net investments, as dependent variable.50
Therefore, when using the HFO data, the evidence in favor of the theoretical hy-
potheses is found in spite of measuring investments including franchise fees rather
than because of it.
47These results are robust to the inclusion of the additional control variables presented in the
next subsection. In addition, the e¤ect of the passing of the laws increases its relevance when
Virginia is not considered in the good-cause law group. Virginia is the only state, within the
states that have passed good-cause laws, which did not require a good-cause for renewal. It only
required a good-cause for anticipated termination.
48In BFG data less than 8% of the franchisors changed their headquarters state during the
sample period. When restricting the sample only to franchisors that did not changed their
headquarters location similar results are found.
49There is no statistically signicant di¤erence in the impact of the passing of the laws between
franchisors that were established before the passing of the laws in their states and franchisors
established after the passing of the laws.
50The marginal e¤ects, which consider the interaction between the dummy headquarter good-
cause and number of states, evaluated at the sample means, are similar.
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In the theoretical model we do not model the franchisors moral hazard prob-
lem. The consequence of this omission is that the optimal royalty rate in the model
is zero. If the franchisors moral hazard would have been modeled, royalty rate
would have been positive, and law enforcement and monitoring costs may have
had an impact on royalty rates. Considering the franchiseesmoral hazard prob-
lem, we would expect that when the franchiseesincentives to provide sales e¤ort
are weaker the franchisor might choose to reduce the royalty rate, in addition to
increase investment requirements, to correct the franchisees incentives. However,
considering the franchisors moral hazard problem, when monitoring and termi-
nating is more costly, the franchisor needs a higher interest in the franchisees
sales in order to not abandon her policing activities. Thus, from the franchisors
moral hazard problem perspective, it can be argued that royalty rates should in-
crease when monitoring and enforcing is harder. We can examine these e¤ects
by estimating equation (16) replacing investment requirements with royalty rates.
This result is presented in Table III.6, column III. The dummy law does not have
a statistically signicant impact on the franchisors royalty rate. The impact of
the number of states on royalty rates is positive, though economically small: for
every additional state in which a franchisor operates she increases the royalty rate
by 0.01%.51 The theoretical ambiguity that weak law enforcement and monitor-
ing costs have on royalty rates, in addition to the weak empirical results, justify
not explicitly modeling the franchisors moral hazard problem and focusing in the
investment dimension.
In column IV of Table III.6 we analyze the e¤ect number of states and the
51In unreported regressions we nd that the statistical signicance impact of number of states
on investment requirements is lost when xed e¤ects are introduced.
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passing of good-cause laws on initial franchise fees. In the extension of the rst
essay we show that the e¤ect of monitoring costs and law enforcement on initial
franchise fees cannot be unambiguously signed. On the one hand, weaker law
enforcement and higher monitoring costs could increase the initial franchise fee
that can be extracted from franchisees, because the probability of an anticipated
contract termination is reduced, increasing the expected rents the franchisee can
obtain from the franchise contract. We call this the direct e¤ect. On the other
hand, weaker law enforcement and higher monitoring costs could imply lower sales
e¤ort, in equilibrium. As sales e¤ort has a positive externality e¤ect, an average
reduction of sales e¤ort could lead to lower revenues for the franchise chain, and
thus, lower franchise fees can be extracted. We call this the indirect e¤ect. The
dependent variable used in column IV is the logarithm of initial franchise fees.
The results presented in this column show that number of states and the passing
of good-cause laws have a positive impact on initial franchise fees, suggesting that
the direct e¤ect is dominating the indirect e¤ect. However, only the number of
states is statistically signicant.
In Tables III.5 and III.6 it is shown that the impact of the passing of the laws on
the average investment requirements a franchisor asks is decreasing in the number
of states in which a franchisor operates, given that a franchisor has more chances
of contracting around the law when she operates in multiple states. The inclusion
of the interaction term, however, is imposing a functional form which implies that
the impact of the law on investment requirements decreases at a constant rate for
every additional state in which a franchisor operates: @ ln(I)
@Law
= +states. Using
this functional form it was found that the impact of the law for a franchisor that
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operates only in one state was 10-11%.
If the functional form is not correct, we might over or under estimate the true
e¤ect of the passing of the law on franchisors that operate only in one state. To
avoid imposing any functional form on the interaction term, we divide the BFG
data in two subsamples. One subsample contains franchisors that operate units
only in one state. About 10% of the sample (1,032 franchisor-year observations)
satises this criterion. The other subsample contains franchisors that operate
in multiple states (9,015 franchisor-year observations). The average multi-state
franchisor operates in 20 states. Column I of Table III.7 shows the impact of the
passing of the laws for franchisors that operate only in one state and column II
shows the average impact of the passing of the law for franchisors that operate in
multiple states. The impact of the passing of the law on the average investment
requirements is 24% for franchisors that operate only in one state, but it is only
3% for franchisors that operate in multiple states. These results suggest that
franchisors that cannot contract around the good-cause law in their home state are
greatly a¤ected by the passing of the law and that this e¤ect was underestimated
in Tables III.6 and III.7. On the other hand, the impact of the passing of the law
is not that important for franchisors that can contract around it.
While it is likely that a franchisor that operates in a single state operates
her franchise units in her headquarters state, this may not always be the case.
For some franchisors BFG data provides information about the identity of state
in which they operate more units. Considering franchisors that operate only in
a single state we can identify whether the state where the units operate is the
same as the state where the franchisors headquarters is located. Among the
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1,032 franchisors-year observations that operate units in a single state, there are
53 observations without data regarding the state in which the franchisor operates
her units. For 909 observations, the franchisors headquarters state and the state
where they operate their units coincides. For 70 observations it doesnt. Using
only the 909 observations where the location of the franchisorsheadquarters coin-
cides with the state of operations the results get even more striking. The impact of
the passing of the law on investment requirements go up to 38%. This estimation
is shown in Table III.7, column III. This result reinforces the notion that when it
is harder to contract around the law the impact on the average contract terms a
franchisor o¤ers increases.52
III.4.3-Robustness Checks
One of the results shown in the previous subsections is that monitoring costs,
measured by the number of states in which a franchisor operates, is positively
related with investment requirements. This relation is unlikely to be driven by
reverse causality because the data with which the results were generated comes
from surveys in which franchisors are asked the number of states in which they op-
erate in the present date and what are the contract terms they set for prospective
franchisees. Thus, contract terms decisions are made after the geographic ex-
pansion is realized. However, the positive relationship between number of states
and investment requirements can potentially be spurious and simply be due to an
omitted variable that a¤ects simultaneously both variables in the same direction.
We propose four alternative mechanisms that could be driving the results and
52Considering only the franchisors that operate all their units in their headquarters state we
nd that the impact the passing of the law on royalty rates is negative and not statistically
signicant.
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show that after controlling for them the number of states in which a franchisor
operates and investments requirements are still positively correlated. The vari-
ables that are going to be included as additional explanatory variables to control
for those mechanisms are: franchisors projected new units, franchisors nancial
assistance, contract length and advertisement fees. These variables are available
in the BFG database. While incorporating these variables is a good exercise to
discard the possibility of omitted variable bias, the parameters that are estimated
might be biased as franchisors nancial assistance, contract length and advertise-
ment fees are endogenous contract terms chosen by the franchisor. This is why
they were not included in the previous estimations based on the BFG data.
Once we control for the number of outlets in which a franchisor operates, a
franchisor that operates in more states arguably has higher monitoring costs as
she has a broader geographic scope of operations. However, the decision to op-
erate in a broader geographical area is endogenous and the underlying reason of
the geographic expansion might be what really causes the increase in investment
requirements. Thus, higher monitoring costs, which is a consequence of the ex-
pansion, might be unrelated to investment requirements once the reason of the
expansion is properly controlled for. The most likely reason for a franchisor to
geographically expand is having good investment opportunities. It can be argued
that a franchisor with better investment opportunities might also be interested in
franchising bigger outlets, which require higher investment. Therefore, we need
to control for franchisors investment opportunities to discard the possibility that
its omission is what drives the positive relation between number of states and in-
vestment requirements. The ideal control for investment opportunities is Tobins
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q. The usual proxy for Tobins q is constructed dividing rmsmarket value by
rmsasset value. Thus, this measure can be constructed only for publicly traded
rms. This implies several shortcomings. First, only a handful of the franchisors
in our data are publicly traded rms. Second, most franchisors that are pub-
licly traded have nationwide operations, implying no variability in the number of
states in which they operate. Third, many of the franchisors that are publicly
traded belong to a parent company, so their investment opportunities cannot be
told apart from the investment opportunities of all the rms that operate under
the same parent company. An alternative variable that proxies for investment op-
portunities and is available at BFG database is franchisors projected new units.
If a franchisor thinks her business is likely to have a big expansion, she projects
that a large number of units are going to be opened in the upcoming year. Thus,
projected new units is one of the additional control variables we use.
Variations in the nancial assistance that franchisors o¤er franchisees can also
be thought as an important omitted variable. It can be the case that franchisors
that expand to newer states concurrently start o¤ering nancial assistance. If
this is the case, investment requirements are likely to increase, given that credit
constraints are relaxed for franchisees. In the BFG database there is information
regarding the o¤ering of nancial assistance by the franchisor. The answer that
franchisors give when asked if they give nancial assistance is either Yes or No.
Thus, we construct a dummy variable for nancial assistance and include it as an
additional control.
Longer contract lengths imply more protection for the franchisees investment;
thus, more investment is expected, in equilibrium, when longer contract terms
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are o¤ered. To the extent that longer contract terms are o¤ered to franchisees in
new markets it can be the case that the positive relationship between investment
requirements and number of states is driven by the omission of the contract length
as an explanatory variable. Contract length can be found in the BFG database.
It ranges from 1 to 40 years with a mean of 11.2. This variable is also included
as an additional control.
A franchisor that expands to newer markets might nd it optimal to advertise
more given her broaden scope of operations. This, in turn, can increase the
optimal size of the outlets. Therefore, we include the advertisement fee rate that
franchisors ask, as a percentage of the franchisees revenues, as an additional
explanatory variable. This variable can also be found in the BGF database.
Besides including additional explanatory variables to shoot down a potential
omitted variable bias, in the present setting we reincorporate franchisorsxed ef-
fects to address the potential correlation between franchisors characteristics with
the explanatory variables. As we use BFG to perform this additional estimation,
the cost of using franchisors xed e¤ects is that the dummy law has to be dropped
as there is no within franchisor variation in the passing of the laws. This is not a
major drawback since in this section we are interested in providing robustness to
the positive relationship between number of states and investment requirements.
Equation (17) is what we estimate.
ln(Ifit) = + statesfit + xfit + f + 't + "fit (17)
We estimate equation (17) correcting standard errors by clustering at the in-
dustry level (45 industries). The results are reported in Table III.8. Column I
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shows the estimation of equation (17) without including the additional controls.
It is shown that even after including franchisor xed e¤ects the number states
increases investment requirements in a statistically signicant way using the BFG
data. In column II, the additional controls are included. The number of obser-
vations is only 7,837 as the additional control has some missing values. Besides
contract length, no control variable has a statistically signicant e¤ect on invest-
ment requirements. More important, the number of states still has a positive and
statistically signicant e¤ect on investment requirements after including these ad-
ditional control variables. A franchisor that expands its operations to another
state increases the investment requirements she asks prospective franchisees by
0.63%.
To the extent that the decision of not replying is not random, the missing
observations of the additional controls can potentially generate sample selection
problems by considering only the franchisors that choose to answer. We use a
multiple imputation procedure to overcome this problem. Multiple imputation
procedure replaces each missing value with a set of plausible values to represent
the uncertainty about the right value to impute (Rubin 2004). Using states,
experience squared, number of outlets, number of outlets squared, rm and time
xed e¤ects, we generate the deterministic component of the imputation. Then,
standard errors are adjusted to account for the uncertainty in their generation.
After replacing the missing values for projected new units, nancial assistance
and contract length (advertisement fees has no missing observations) we re-run
equation (17). These results are shown in Table III.8, column III. The results are
qualitatively unaltered relative to the ones reported in column II. Thus, we can
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conclude that the number of states e¤ectively increases investment requirements
even after controlling for variables that account for alternative explanations and
after correcting for the potential sample selection problem generated from missing
observations in these controls.
An additional robustness check can be performed in our setting. Rather than
using number of states as independent variable, we exploit franchisorsheadquar-
ters location to obtain a new explanatory variable. This new variable is designed
to measure the average distance a franchisor travels to directly monitor her fran-
chisees. We call this variable distance. Franchisors expansion patterns is usually
regional. They expand rst to the states nearer the state from where they are
headquartered and last to the states that are further away from their headquarters
location. We compute the distance between each state to all other possible states,
generating a 51 by 51 matrix, where the 51st state is the District of Columbia.
Then, each state is sorted according their distance to each other, from closer to
further, and the average travel distance from each state to the "ith" closer states
is computed. For instance, the average distance from Alabama to its 10th nearer
states is 296 miles and the average distance to its 30th nearer states is 606 miles;
while the average distance from Arizona to its 10th nearer states is 550 miles and
the average distance to its 30th nearer states is 986 miles. This average distance
is merged with the number of states in which a franchisor operates according to
their headquarters state. Thus, a measure of the average distance to monitor is
computed, according to the franchisors location and how many states she serves.
This variable is expressed in hundreds of miles.
The distance variable has one advantage and one disadvantage relative to mea-
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suring geographic dispersion using the number of states. The advantage is that
it does not assign the same incremental value for each additional state; it com-
putes the increase in the average distance to monitor depending on the franchisors
headquarters location. The disadvantage is that it uses the assumption that the
franchisors expansion is perfectly ordered, expanding to the closer states rst and
later to the ones that are further away. Column I of Table III.9 shows the result of
estimating equation (17) reaplacing the variable number of states by the variable
distance and including all the controls used in Table III.8. We nd that when a
franchisor increases its average monitoring distance by 100 miles, she increases the
investment requirements she ask franchisees by 2.1%. This result is statistically
signicant at the 1% level. In column II of Table II.9 we replicate the estimation
of column I using the aforementioned multiple imputation procedure. Now the
coe¢ cient of the variable distance increases to 2.9%, remaining statistically sig-
nicant at the 1% level. The main intuition that Table III.9 conveys is that the
increase of investment requirements due to higher monitoring costs is robust to
the use of an alternative variable that captures geographic dispersion other than
number of states.
The BFG database allows us to perform a nal robustness check. This database
contains not only the total number of outlets a franchisor operates, but also the
number of units that are franchised and owned by the franchisor. This allows us to
construct the percentage of franchised units a franchisor operates from the data.
The sample mean of franchised units is 81%. Previous literature nds that higher
monitoring costs increases the percentage of franchised units a franchisor operates
(see Lafontaine and Slade (2007) for a literature review on this topic). Thus, if
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the number of states is a good measure of monitoring costs we would expect it to
have a positive impact on the percentage of franchise units a franchisor operates.
The intuition behind higher monitoring costs increasing the percentage of fran-
chised units is as follows. A franchisee has more powerful incentives than an owned
unit, managed by an employee, as the franchisee is the residual claimant of the
store revenues. Thus, free-riding on the store brand-name, by reducing sales ef-
fort, is less likely to occur in a franchised outlet than in an owned outlet when
the monitoring frequency is the same. This implies that when monitoring costs
increase it is optimal for franchisors to franchise a larger fraction of outlets as it
is relatively harder to control sales e¤ort in owned units.
We estimate equation (17) replacing investment requirements with percentage
of franchise units. The results of this estimation are shown in Table III.10, column
I. In column II we repeat this estimation utilizing multiple imputation procedure.
We show that it is actually the case that a franchisor that operates in more
states franchises a higher proportion of their outlets, even after controlling for
her experience. This result reinforces the notion that number of states is a good
measure of franchisorsmonitoring costs.
To sum up, this subsection provides evidence that monitoring costs are in-
deed the cause of the increase of investment requirements by eliminating concerns
regarding potential omitted variable bias, by using an alternative measure of geo-
graphic dispersion, other than number of states, and by showing that our measure
of geographic dispersion also a¤ects other dimensions of franchise contracts (i.e.,




In this subsection we consider two alternative hypotheses that could explain
why investment requirements increase after the passing of good-cause laws, other
than the franchisors using investments as a self-enforcing device. However, we
argue below that one of these hypotheses is at odds with additional evidence pre-
sented in previous studies, while the other hypothesis is implicitly accounted for in
our empirical analysis. Therefore, the self-enforcement hypothesis remains as the
most likely explanation for our results. Moreover, the self-enforcement hypothesis
is the only hypothesis that can also explain why broader geographic dispersion of
outlets results in franchisors asking for higher investment requirements.
The good-cause laws were lobbied by the service-station-dealer association and
the National Franchisee Association Coalition (Brickley et al. 1991). One of the
arguments that were given to pass the bills was that without the law a franchisor
could unfairly terminate a franchisee and reconvert it into an owned unit. If
franchisors were indeed unfairly terminating contracts, the passing of the law
would have beneted them, and the franchising activity as a whole, as it allows
franchisors to commit not to unfairly terminate contracts. This, in turn, will
generate the necessary conditions to protect the franchiseesinvestments. Thus,
investment requirements could have increased for this reason and not because
franchisors were using them as a self-enforcing device. However, there are two
pieces of evidence that contradict the commitment hypothesis. First, Brickley et
al. (1991) show that the stock prices of franchisors located in California dropped
after the passing of the law in that state. Second, Brickley et al. (1991) and
Klick et al. (2007) show that the franchise activity went down in the states were
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the laws were passed. These two pieces of evidence are at odds with the laws
being benecial to franchisors or the franchising activity in general. Therefore,
the commitment hypothesis is unlikely to explain the increased in investments
that was observed after the passing of the laws.
An alternative hypothesis that could explain an increase in investments after
the laws were passed is the following. Klick et al. (2007) document that after
the passing of the laws the total number of units a franchisor operates decreases:
the number of franchise units decreases more than the increase in franchisor-
owned units. They interpret this pattern as franchisors having more trouble in
maintaining a standard level of quality in their franchised units. The reduction
in the total number of outlets, however, could imply that the optimal size of the
outlet increases and investment requirements could have increased for this reason.
The fewer, but bigger outlets hypothesis, however, cannot explain our results.
We nd that investment requirements increase even after controlling by the total
number of units a franchisor operates (franchised and owned). What can be argued
is that the total number of units is not exogenous as it is also determined by the
passing of the laws and that this could bias the parameter of the dummy law on
investment requirements. Nevertheless, this bias works against our results. If the
dummy law has a negative impact on the number of outlets, the parameter that
accompanies the dummy law in the regressions we run not only captures the true
e¤ect of the passing of the law on investment requirements, but also the projection
of the dummy law on the number of outlets, which is negative. Therefore, we nd
that the passing of the law has a positive impact on investment requirements in
spite of the potential endogeneity of the number of outlets. Furthermore, when
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we run the number of outlets on the dummy law we do not nd that the reduction
in the number of outlets is statistically signicant in any of our two samples,
implying that this e¤ect is not of major relevance.53
III.5-Conclusion
The evidence presented in this essay nds support for the hypotheses derived
on the rst essay, where investment requirement was assumed to be used by fran-
chisors as a tool to boost franchisees sales e¤ort. We show that franchisors
increase investment requirements after the passing of the good-cause termina-
tion/nonrenewal laws as these laws weakened the franchisors ability to terminate
a contract with a misbehaving franchisee. We also show that a franchisor in-
crease investment requirements when they expand geographically as her ability to
directly monitor is hindered.
The results presented here are economically sizable. A franchisor who oper-
ates all her outlets in a state where a good-cause law has been enacted asks for
investment requirements 38% higher than a franchisor that operates in a state
without such law. In addition, a franchisor that expands its operations by one
state increases investment requirements between 0.6-1%. Thus, the conict of
interests between the franchisor and the franchisees is shown to be economically
relevant.
In addition, our results show that investment requirements are an endogenous
contract term. This contrasts with the previous empirical franchise literature
in which investment requirement was considered as an exogenous explanatory
53A similar argument can be constructed for the number of states.
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variable. Knowing what the determinants of investment requirements are can
help to generate new identication strategies when using investment requirements
as an explanatory variable.
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CHAPTER IV
How Do Firm Financial Conditions A¤ect Product Quality and
Pricing?
(joint with Gordon Phillips)
IV.I-Introduction
Financial distress is frequently cited as inuencing rm value by causing rms
to take actions that would be suboptimal in normal times in order to reduce
their chance of entering bankruptcy and potentially being liquidated.54 Potential
costs of nancial distress and bankruptcy are commonly given as a reason for
rms to have less debt than they would have otherwise chosen given the potential
tax advantages of debt. The potential costs of nancial distress and bankruptcy
include the possibility that customers and suppliers may not wish to do business
with a rm that is likely to fail as they may lose value if the rm is liquidated
(Titman 1984). Additionally, in nancial distress, the rm may produce a lower
quality product and attempt to sell this product as higher quality in order to stave
o¤ bankruptcy as modeled by Maksimovic and Titman (1991). Empirically, the
importance of these e¤ects is unknown.
We examine how product quality and pricing decisions vary with nancial
distress and bankruptcy in the airline industry. We analyze whether managers
reduce product market quality and prices in periods of nancial distress before
the rm actually defaults, as well as quality and pricing decisions in bankruptcy.
54See for example, the Wall Street Journal, Dec 17, 2008, p B1. Also see Asquith, Gertner
and Scharfstein (1994) for rm-specic actions taken by a sample of junk-bond issuers to avoid
bankruptcy.
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Our measure of nancial distress is a rms probability of default, calculated using
Mertons distance to default measure. Changes in the probability of default may
reduce a rms incentives to produce a high quality product since a reduction in
quality may increase current cash ows at the expense of bondholders who may
receive less in the future. Similarly, the rm may also have incentives to lower
prices to increase market share and current cash ow even if this triggers a price
war in the future. Bankruptcy, however, can have a di¤erent e¤ect. In bankruptcy,
the time horizon of rm managers may be longer, as debtholders and other xed
claimants are closer to becoming future owners of the rm and management may
also wish to be involved in the rm post-bankruptcy.55 In addition, rm claimants
incentives to invest in customer retention may increase under bankruptcy, as they
need to demonstrate to the bankruptcy judge that the rm is viable as a going
concern. Thus the rm managers and claimants to the rm may have incentives
to increase quality in bankruptcy relative to periods of nancial distress to keep
existing customers.
We examine how two di¤erent components of product quality in the airline
industry, mishandled baggage and on-time performance, and airline pricing, are
related to nancial distress and bankruptcy. Econometrically, we estimate a simul-
taneous system of equations for price, quantity and quality along with nancial
distress and bankruptcy.
We nd that airlinesquality and pricing decisions are a¤ected by nancial
distress and bankruptcy. Financial distress reduces a rms incentive to invest
55Hotchkiss (1995) examines rms post-bankrutcy and nds that the management of many
bankrupt rms does not change after emerging from Chapter 11 and nds evidence of ine¢ cient
continuation of rms post bankruptcy. Strömberg (2000) documents that conicts of interest
in bankruptcy auctions can lead to ine¢ cient continuation decisions.
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in quality. In addition, rms price more aggressively when in nancial distress,
consistent with them trying to increase short-term market share and revenues.
Interestingly, the negative e¤ects of nancial distress on product quality are not
present during bankruptcy. In bankruptcy, product quality increases relative
to the pre-bankruptcy nancial distress period, consistent with airlines investing
in customer retention and reputation through product quality. We do not nd
evidence that rms price di¤erently in bankruptcy relative to periods of nancial
distress.
We add to the previous literature on bankruptcy and nancial distress by focus-
ing on identifying real e¤ects on quality. Hoshi, Kashap, and Scharfstein (1990),
Asquith, Gertner, and Scharfstein (1994), Sharpe (1994) and Hotchkiss (1995) nd
that nancially distressed rms have a greater tendency to cut investment, sell
assets, and reduce employment than their non-leveraged counterparts. Campello
(2003) shows that sales growth of leveraged high debt rms drops more in reces-
sions. However, Andrade and Kaplan (1998) and Khanna and Poulsen (1995)
nd no di¤erences in actions by nancially distressed rms versus benchmarked
competitors. Maksimovic and Phillips (1998) nd that industry conditions are
a primary determinant of bankruptcy outcomes and largely e¢ cient liquidation
decisions. Khanna and Tice (2005) show that high debt rms are more likely to
exit low price cities and are more likely to be e¢ cient.
Previous research on nancial distress in airlines by Pulvino (1998) has docu-
mented that asset sales by distressed airline rms are associated with a signicant
price discount. Additional articles have examined the e¤ect of nancial conditions
on airline accident rates. Rose (1990) examines airline accidents and nds that
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accident rates decrease with an airlines operating margin a measure of nancial
health of an airline. Dionne et al (1997) criticizes Roses approach arguing that
operating margin is not the right measure of nancial health because underinvest-
ment in airline safety can increase operating margin in absence of accidents. They
propose leverage as a measure of nancial condition and obtain mixed results for
the e¤ect of nancial condition on airline safety. Noronha and Singal (2004) use
bond ratings to capture the nancial health of an airline and nd that better
bond ratings are related to lower accident rates. However, they only examine
cross-sectional variation between rms. It is likely that better-run airlines could
have caused both lower accident rates and higher bond ratings creating an omit-
ted variable bias. Several papers examine pricing decisions directly. Busse (2002)
examines how nancially distressed rms price in the airline industry and nds
prices are cut when leverage is high or interest coverage is low. Borenstein and
Rose (1995) show that prices decline pre-bankruptcy but then remain constant in
bankruptcy. They conclude that rms change their prices due to nancial distress
and not due to bankruptcy because consumers believe that nancially distressed
rms o¤er lower quality, which in turn lowers demand and optimally lowers rm
price. While this is a possible interpretation there is no evidence in that paper
that nancially distressed rms actually o¤er lower quality or that the reduction
in price is due to a reduction in demand. Our article documents the direct e¤ect
of nancial conditions on product quality showing that there is an additional cost
of nancial distress in the form of reduced quality of service for the airlines cus-
tomers and examines the di¤erences between the e¤ects of nancial distress and
bankruptcy.
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Lastly, a series of papers examines bankruptcy and not nancial distress.
Borenstein and Rose (2003) examine the e¤ect of the share of airport capacity
operated by airlines in bankruptcy on the number of ights and destinations from
a given airport. They nd that the number of ights from a given airport de-
creases for bankrupt airlines. However it is hard to interpret this nding given
that bankruptcy is an endogenous outcome. Two recent papers by Ciliberto and
Schenone (2009, 2010) focus just on bankruptcy and examine the impact of bank-
ruptcy on airline pricing, product variety and on-time performance. They do
not examine nancial distress as they exclude two quarters of data prior to the
rm declaring bankruptcy and they also do not compute any probability of bank-
ruptcy for non-bankrupt periods and non-bankrupt airlines. They thus compare
bankruptcy to non-distress periods for airlines that declare bankruptcy.56 Lastly
Benmelech and Bergman (2010) examine how bankruptcy of one rm imposes
negative externalities on non-bankrupt industry competitors by driving down the
collateral value of assets used in the industry. They show that the cost of debt
nancing increases for nonbankrupt industry rms.
Our paper contributes on multiple dimensions to our understanding of how
nancial distress and bankruptcy a¤ect rm quality and pricing decisions. First,
our paper examines the e¤ect of both nancial distress and bankruptcy on prod-
uct quality and pricing. We show that rmsquality decisions are substantially
di¤erent in nancial distress and bankruptcy versus non-bankrupt periods. Our
paper is the rst to show econometrically that rms reduce quality when faced
with nancial distress in order to increase their probability of near term survival.
56Financial distress might start earlier than just 2 periods before bankruptcy. In that scenario,
they compare a compound of distressed and not distressed peridos with bankruptcy.
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In contrast we show that rms increase quality in bankruptcy relative to periods
of nancial distress. Second, we simultaneously estimate equations for the rms
pricing, quantity, quality decisions and its nancial condition, explicitly control-
ling for the endogeneity of nancial condition using the tangibility of the rms
assets as instrument. Without controlling for the endogeneity of nancial condi-
tion, the estimated e¤ects of nancial condition on quality and prices might be
biased, because lower rm quality or prices may be the cause of nancial distress
and bankruptcy in the rst place. Lastly, we have a more precise measure of a
rms nancial distress than the previous literature as we use Mertons probability
of default, which is a continuous and more accurate measure of nancial distress.
Our paper proceeds as follows. In Section IV.2 we give the theoretical back-
ground and also present our econometric model. In section IV.3, we describe
our data. Section IV.4 presents the results for nancial distress and bankruptcy.
Section IV.5 concludes.
IV.2-Quality and Pricing in Financial Distress and
Bankruptcy
In this section we describe how nancial distress and bankruptcy may a¤ect a
rms quality and pricing decisions. In section IV.2.1 we describe the theoretical
background and also describe the implications we test from the prior theoretical
literature. In section IV.2.2 we present the econometric model we estimate.
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IV.2.1-Theoretical Background
We draw on the theoretical article by Maksimovic and Titman (1991) in for-
mulating the hypotheses we test. Consider a rm with some degree of market
power, to the extent it can choose price and quality. Assume also that the good
sold by the rm is an experience good so the quality is not known beforehand. In
periods of nancial distress, rm managers and equity holders may have incentives
to lower the quality of the product they sell if they can earn higher prots until
the lower quality is observed. Firms can cut quality and given that quality pro-
vision is costly, this will lower the marginal cost of production. Until consumers
realize the good sold is of lower quality, rms will earn higher prots. Once the
lower quality is observed, rms will face reduced demand. If the claimants do not
bear the full cost of this reduced demand or face a very high discount rate, they
may have incentives to shift prots into nearby periods. These features t well
the airline industry. In the airline industry, rms provision of quality is to some
extent unobserved at the time an airline ticket is sold. Consumers can observe
lagged measures of quality, but quality at the actual time the ight is taken may
be quite di¤erent than past quality. Firms may also face a very high demand for
current prots and may be willing to trade future prots for current prots.
Debt, nancial distress and bankruptcy play a role just as in the Maksimovic
and Titman model, as nancial distress and expected bankruptcy can increase the
incentives of rms to lower quality. The intuition for nancial distress to play a
role is simple and follows directly from their model. If the rm defaults on its debt,
debtholders rather than equityholders bear the loss of the future market share. If
a rm faces a signicant chance of defaulting on its debt, it may choose to cut
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quality today in order to survive in the hopes that there is a positive demand
shock before consumers discover the lower quality. The positive demand shock
may enable survival, despite the demand reduction that comes as a consequence
of lower past quality. Afterwards, the rm can rebuild its reputation.
Put di¤erently, the probability of default enters in the airlines supply of quality
decision. The rms supply of quality will be a¤ected by a higher probability
of default because the future benets of quality diminish, given that there is a
higher probability that the rm will enter into bankruptcy (equivalent to a higher
discount rate). To the extent that not all consumers are aware of this present
cut in quality, the rm optimally reduces quality taking an involuntary loan from
consumers. This might help the rm, in the short run, to avoid bankruptcy.
Airline pricing can also be a¤ected by nancial distress. Morrison andWinston
(1996) and Busse (2002) have found evidence that the prices in the airline industry
are characterized by alternating periods of tacit collusive agreements and price
wars. Price wars can be triggered as a rm reduces prices and deviates from the
tacit collusive agreement prices in order to gain market share in the short run.
As a higher default probability is equivalent to a higher discount rate a rm in
nancial distress will be more prone to reduce prices even if this triggers a price
war in the future, given that bondholders might be the ones who receive less in
the future if this happens. This logic holds only if there is no immediate detection
of the price deviation. While the reduction in prices can be observed, airlines can
modify the average price of their tickets by changing the composition of seats sold
without changing their posted prices and this action may go unnoticed by other
airlines for a signicant period, giving scope for a non immediate detection from
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competitors.57 This logic di¤ers from Borenstein and Rose (1995) interpretation of
pre-bankruptcy price reduction. They argue that prices go down because demand
is lower for a distressed rm. Our hypothesis is that even after controlling for
demand changes there is still an incentive to reduce prices as a rms nancial
distress increases.
We thus test the following central implication:
Hypothesis 1: Firms cut product quality and price as the probability of
default increases.
Our main focus is on nancial distress but we extend our analysis to Chapter
11 bankruptcy. We also consider the e¤ect of operating in Chapter 11 bank-
ruptcy on rmsdecisions. Chapter 11 bankruptcy is a state in which the rm
continues to operate while it is attempting to reorganize. There are several key
provisions of Chapter 11 bankruptcy that are relevant to our analysis: the auto-
matic stay provision, the voting procedure in Chapter 11, the feasibility test, and
debtor-in-possession nancing. These provisions are described fully in Gertner
and Scharfstein (1991), who theoretically show how they a¤ect rm investment
and emergence from Chapter 11.
During Chapter 11, under the automatic stay provision payments to creditors
are deferred while the rm reorganizes.58 Firm management has the right to
57It is well known that airlines charge di¤erent prices even within economy class. Each airline
decides how many seats to o¤er at each price using an optimization package (e.g: PROS). The
cheapest seats are sold rst and as time passes the more expensive ones start to sell as well. If an
airline decides to sell all the economy seats at the cheapest price the average price of that airline
will be reduced, yet the posted price might not have changed. This makes the detection of price
deviations di¢ cult because other rms will nd out only after observing that their bookings are
not behaving as expected.
58Aircraft nancing is exempt from automatic stay provision (section 1110 of chapter 11
bankruptcy).
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propose a reorganization plan to emerge from Chapter 11 to the bankruptcy judge.
The plan is then voted upon by claimants to the rm, with each class approving
the plan if one-half by number and two thirds of the aggregate face value agree
to the plan. The plan involves o¤ering new securities to existing claimants under
which they exchange their old debt securities for less senior and covenant free
securities like equity. This exchange o¤er is also called the exit consent provision.
Managements right to propose a plan legally exists for the rst hundred and
twenty days, but extensions are generally automatically granted by the bankruptcy
judge. In addition the bankruptcy judge can approve additional debt securities,
called debtor in possession nancing, that are senior to existing debt issued before
Chapter 11. The additional debt securities allow the rm to have funds to invest
and continue to operate, reducing the debt overhang problem.
This bankruptcy reorganization plan also has to pass a feasibility test specif-
ically management has to demonstrate to the judge that the rm is viable as a
going concern under the new plan. This plan can include a request to the bank-
ruptcy judge that past union contracts be changed and a new wage structure
imposed on the rms employees. In addition, the rm can ask the bankruptcy
judge to turn over past union pensions to the government pension fund, the Pen-
sion Benet Guarantee Corporation (PBGC). The value of the pension paid by
the PBGC is typically much lower than previous commitments under past labor
agreements.
We hypothesize that Chapter 11 bankruptcy a¤ects the incentives of man-
agers di¤erently than the probability of distress. Given that management wishes
to emerge from bankruptcy, it has a much longer term perspective than during
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nancial distress. We hypothesize that it now has incentives to treat existing
customers well and to increase quality and thus invest in its long run reputation.
The e¤ect on price is less clear. There are three conicting incentives. Two of
them imply that prices do not increase with respect to the distress period and
one of them implies that they increase. First, the management does not have to
make interest and principal payments and as such has more exibility to reduce
price59. Second, airlines need to convince consumers to y with them in spite
of potential recent quality cuts and the consumers potential belief that the rm
may be liquidated. Therefore, prices shouldnt increase. However, an airline also
has to demonstrate feasibility to the bankruptcy judge and thus, controlling for
demand, it must demonstrate that it can make prots on a per customer basis,
which may give an incentive to raise prices. Given the ambiguity in the e¤ect of
bankruptcy on prices, we are only able to state our second central hypothesis in
terms of product quality:
Hypothesis 2: In bankruptcy, rms increase product quality relative to pre-
bankruptcy nancial distress periods.
IV.2.2-Empirical Strategy and Econometric Model
Our empirical strategy analyzes the e¤ects of nancial distress, measured as
default probability, and bankruptcy on a rms supply decisions (product-quality
and price). We analyze nancial distress separately from bankruptcy as a rms
default probability is not dened when a rm is in bankruptcy. Our measure of
default probability is based on stock prices and when rms go into bankruptcy,
59Additionally, airlines can renegotiate pension benets, reducing their costs (section 1113,
chapter 11).
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specically Chapter 11, are not traded in the market, so there is no information
about their stock price. Following the analysis of the impact of nancial distress
on a rms supply decision we analyze the di¤erential e¤ect of bankruptcy relative
to periods of high nancial distress.
Analyzing the periods of distress is the primary focus of our paper. Analyzing
distress separately from bankruptcy has the advantage of not imposing any value
on the default probability when it is not dened (during bankruptcy). This is im-
portant since we hypothesize that before bankruptcy the default probability plays
the role of a higher discount rate, shortening the rms horizon; but while in bank-
ruptcy a higher nancial distress does not have any direct implication regarding a
rms horizon. We thus rst analyze distress excluding bankruptcy periods and
then separately analyze bankruptcy compared to pre-bankruptcy nancial distress
periods. The cost of analyzing distress separately from bankruptcy is that we
do not use the whole sample in both estimations. We use only non-bankruptcy
rm-quarter observations in analyzing the e¤ect of nancial distress and we use
only distressed and bankrupt rm-quarters to analyze the di¤erential e¤ects of
bankruptcy and nancial distress.
Following our analysis of nancial distress and bankruptcy separately, we use
the whole sample to estimate simultaneously a system that contains both nancial
distress and bankruptcy. We end up nding similar results using this approach as
when we estimate nancial distress and bankruptcy in separate estimations. Thus
in the interest of space, this method and the associated results are presented in
Appendix I. The benet of this approach is that we can analyze the e¤ects of
default probability and bankruptcy on the rms supply decisions at the same
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time. However, there are some limitations to this combined analysis. The main
limitation is that we cannot estimate the probability of nancial distress when the
rm is in bankruptcy. Thus in this case, we set the nancial distress variable to be
undened with a value of zero when the rm is in bankruptcy and let a "predicted"
bankruptcy dummy pick up the full e¤ect of distress and bankruptcy. Note that
we are not explicitly saying the rm is not distressed when in bankruptcy, but
econometrically we are letting the bankruptcy variable to pick up the di¤erent
degrees of nancial distress that a rm might face when the rm is actually in
bankruptcy.60
We now present the econometric approach that we use to analyze nancial
distress and bankruptcy. We rst present the econometric model we use to
analyze nancial distress and then follow with the model for bankruptcy.
IV.2.2.1 Financial distress
In this analysis of nancial distress, we drop rm-quarter observations where
the rm is in bankruptcy as nancial distress is not dened in bankruptcy. We
use a simultaneous equation approach to estimate the impact of the probability
of default on supply decisions. Specically, we jointly examine a rms supply
decisions of quality (S) and price (P) with its quantity demanded (Q) and the
probability of default (Pr_def).
The following 4 simultaneous equations describe the airline economic environ-
ment:
Sit = h(Pit; Qit; P r_defit; Yit) (18)
60With this approach we can think of the rm as operating under 3 di¤erent regimes: non-
distressed and not bankrupt; distressed but not bankrupt, and bankrupt.
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Pit = g(Sit; Qit; P r_defit; Xit) (19)
Qit = f(Pr_defit; Pit; Sit;Wit) (20)
Pr_defit = j(Qit; Pit; Sit;Zit) (21)
In the above equations, S are the two measures of quality, either the mishandled
bags rate or on time departures, P is our measure of price which following the
airline industry convention is calculated as a yield or average price per mile, Q is
the total quantity of total enplaned passengers (TEP), and Pr_def is the default
probability. Equations (1a) and (2a) can be obtained from the optimization prob-
lem of a rm that maximizes prots, (P(.),S(.),Q(.),Pr_def(.)), with respect to S
and P. Equations (20) and (21) are the demand and default probability equations.
Both of them can be a¤ected by the rms pricing and quality decisions.
In order to choose the simplest setting to generate these rst order conditions,
we assume linear demand and assume that the marginal cost of transporting a
passenger and the marginal cost of providing quality are independent. In this
simpler setting, which we adopt for the remaining equations we present, the mar-
ginal e¤ect of quality on price and vice-versa are independent and we can drop P
from equation (18) and S from equation (19). However, the results we obtain are
invariant to their inclusion.
Y, X, W and Z are exogenous variables. Y are the factors that a¤ect supply
of quality; X the factors that a¤ect the pricing strategy; W the factors that a¤ect
quantity demanded, and Z the factors that a¤ect the default probability, which
include a rms capital structure. The variable that a¤ects the supply of quality
in Y is airport decongestion. The variables in X that a¤ect pricing are oil fuel
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cost, average miles per ight, oil e¢ ciency and airport decongestion. The variables
in W that a¤ect quantity demand are competition, income, unemployment and
airport decongestion and the variable in Z is the percentage of liquidable assets.
We will discuss these variables in the data section.
Equations (18)-(21) imply that the quantity demanded, Q, a¤ects the pricing
strategy, as usual, but might also a¤ect the quality supply decision because when
there are high numbers of passengers providing higher quality might be more
costly. Additionally, Q a¤ects the default probability, because lower demand pre-
sumably increases the default probability. Given that pricing and quality decisions
might a¤ect the default probability they are included in equation (21) as well. Fi-
nally, Q is a¤ected by the default probability because consumers might anticipate
the incentives of the airlines to under-provide quality while in nancial distress.
Our instruments for P (Price) are the elements of X that are excluded from
the other 3 equations. Similarly, the instruments of quality (S), quantity (Q) and
Pr_def are the excluded components of Y, W and Z. We instrument Price or yield
(P) with average miles per ight, oil fuel cost and oil e¢ ciency; we instrument
total enplaned passengers (Q) with local income, competition and local unemploy-
ment and we instrument the default probability with the percentage of liquidable
assets. We discuss these instruments and our identication strategy further below.
For now, we just limit ourselves to give a brief intuition of why they satisfy the
exclusion restriction. Oil prices, local area income and unemployment are exoge-
nous to rms decisions. The percentage of liquidable assets is likely to satisfy the
exclusion restriction as it is unlikely that having more valuable assets in case of
liquidation will a¤ect directly the quality of a rms product or its prices. What
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can be argued is that this measure of tangibility has a relation with performance,
because better performance can lead a rm to acquire more xed assets, which
increase the percentage of liquidable assets. In that case, our instrument could
directly a¤ect the rms real outcomes, because it might be capturing unmea-
sured productivity to the extent that our controls are not perfect. Nevertheless,
this is unlikely, because we observe that higher percentage of liquidable assets
is positively related with high nancial distress and bankruptcy, states in which
productivity is unlikely to be high.
We do not have any variable that belongs to the set Y and is excluded from the
other three equations. As a consequence, we are unable to instrument S directly,
thus we replace quality in equations (20) and (21), and estimate:
Sit = h(Qit; P r_defit; Yit) (22)
Pit = g(Qit; P r_defit; Xit) (23)
Qit = f(Pr_defit; Pit; Yit;Wit) (24)
Pr_defit = j(Qit; Pit; Yit;Zit) (25)
We estimate this system using 3 stage least squares (3SLS) to take advantage of the
potential error correlation structure between the equations. In this specication,
we are able to analyze the e¤ect of nancial distress on the price and quality
supply decisions. We also use rm and time xed e¤ects.
IV.2.2.2 Bankruptcy
After considering the e¤ect of nancial distress, we examine the impact of
bankruptcy. We hypothesize that Chapter 11 bankruptcy may a¤ect a rms
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quality positively relative to nancial distress given that a rm wishes to keep
customers as it attempts to emerge from bankruptcy. We do not have a clear
prediction for prices. The rm has more exibility to lower prices in bankruptcy
as it does not has to pay principal and interests on its debt; it also may want to
lower prices to attract reluctant customers that may have observed lower quality
during the period of nancial distress; but the rm also may want to raise prices
relative to those in nancial distress to raise cash to demonstrate to the bankruptcy
judge that it can successfully emerge from bankruptcy.
Instead of including all rm-quarters, we analyze bankrupt rms and compare
their behavior relative to when they were highly nancial distressed. We thus drop
rm-quarters where the rms have low probability of default. Econometrically, we
estimate a similar set of equations as for the nancial distress case, but examining
the impact of bankruptcy (a dummy variable) instead of default probability:
Sit = h(Qit; Bankruptit; Yit) (26)
Pit = g(Qit; Bankruptit; Xit) (27)
Qit = f(Bankruptit; Pit; Yit;Wit) (28)
Bankruptit = j(Qit; Pit; Yit; Zit) (29)
IV.3-Data
IV.3.1-Airline Data
Our data consists of an unbalanced quarterly panel of 21 airlines from the
rst quarter of 1997 to the fourth quarter of 2008. The data was constructed
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using information from Transtats, a site managed by the Bureau of Transporta-
tion Services (BTS); Air Travel Consumer Reports (ATCR) also from the BTS;
Compustat; the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP); and the Bureau
of Economic Analysis (BEA).
Our nal sample is limited to rms included in all data sets. Airlines must have
annual operating revenues of at least US$20 million to be included in Transtats;
they have to have a domestic revenue market share greater than 1% to appear
in ATCR and they must be publicly traded to have their nancial information
included in Compustat and CRSP. Given that we have an unbalanced panel with
some rms entering and exiting the panel, our nal sample contains 647 rm-
quarter observations for the 21 airlines in our sample.61 Table IV.1 summarizes
the names of the carriers, the number of quarters they appear in the sample and
whether each of these carriers had a bankruptcy episode during those quarters.
Of the 21 carriers, 13 never entered into bankruptcy in our sample, 7 had one
bankruptcy episode and only 1 rm, US Airways, had two bankruptcy episodes.
From Transtats we obtain each airlines domestic operating passenger revenue
(DOPR), domestic passenger revenue miles (DPRM) and domestic total enplaned
passengers (TEP) by segment.62 TEP represents our measure of quantity, mea-
sured in millions of passengers; dividing DORP by DRPM we obtain the yield,
which is our measure of price. Yield is a common price indicator in the airline
61Our unit of analysis is rm-quarters as there is no information at the route level for mis-
handled baggage.
62We measure TEP on a segment basis; measuring TEP on a leg basis leads to similar results.
The di¤erence between legs and segments is best understood by an example. Suppose an airlline
ies from A to B, and from B to C. A passenger ying from A to B or B to C would be counted
as one segment and one leg. A passenger ying from A to C, with a setpover in B, would be
counted as one passenger in terms of segments, but two passengers in terms of legs.
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industry, measuring the average price per mile a passenger is paying. Yield is
measured in $US cents following common industry practice. Prices are measured
at the time tickets are purchased, not when they are used.
We study two measures of quality: on time performance from Transtats and
mishandled bags per 1,000 customers from ATCR. We do not consider accidents as
these are rare events and because Rhoades and Waguespack (2000) nd safety and
service quality to be highly correlated. We also considered including the number
of customer complaints but the Department of Transportation (DOT) reports that
it has not determined the validity of the complaints - thus our measures are more
objective.63 The BTS classies a ight as late if it is 15 or more minutes late
from the scheduled arrival time. Nevertheless, constructing a dummy variable
that takes a value of 1 if the ight is late and zero otherwise may hide information
on how late are ights.64
Our variable Late is constructed as the average delay of late ights times
the percentage of late ights. For instance, if a rm in a quarter has 20% of
its ights arriving late and their late ights are on average 50 minutes late, the
variable Latetakes a value of 50*0.2=10. To get higher quality as an increasing
function, we dene "On Time Performance" as the inverse of Late.
From ATCR we obtain the mishandled baggage rate per 1,000 passengers.
According to the DOT, the denition of mishandled baggage is lost, damaged,
63We do not consider other measures of service quality, such as the ight cancellation rate,
not because we think they are not important, but because they do not satisfy the Maksimovic
and Titman (1991) framework in which quality cuts increase short term prots. There is no
short-term benet of cancelling a ight since passengers have to be relocated in other ights in
the short run. The determinants of ight cancellation can be better explained at the route level
(See Rupp and Holmes, 2003).
64Airlines sometimes are able to manipulate arrival times for ights that are on the border of
being on time. Our measure does not su¤er as signicantly from this potential manipulation.
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delayed or pilfered baggage. Note that airlines, and not airports, control impor-
tant aspects of baggage handling given that airlines have to relabel baggage when
there is a change in schedule. Also airlines can decide whether to invest in a better
monitoring technology in terms of bar-coding and decide how many personnel to
assign to the monitoring of bags. Again, to get higher quality as an increasing
function, we dene our variable as the inverse of the mishandled baggage rate, so
the higher this rate is, less baggage is lost. Our sample starts in the rst quarter
on 1997 because there is no previous information about mishandled baggage.
Figures IV.1 through IV.3 present some initial summary statistics for rms in
the quarters preceding and following bankruptcy. Figure IV.1 presents the inverse
of mishandled bags, Figure IV.2 presents on-time performance and Figure IV.3
presents airline pricing. All data is quarterly, with quarter zero representing the
rst quarter a rm is in bankruptcy.
The gures show that quality and price measures decrease in the quarters prior
to bankruptcy. Additionally, gures 1A and 1B show that quality increases after
bankruptcy is declared.
Table IV.2 presents similar summary statistics. However, in this table we
report detrended data, where we detrend the quality and price variables by re-
gressing the raw measures on time dummies and rm dummies. Thus we use the
residuals of these equations to construct Table IV.2. This table includes data
only for rms that go into bankruptcy at some point in the sample and splits
the data into observations more than four quarters before bankruptcy, the four
quarters right before bankruptcy and the period the rm is in bankruptcy itself.





Table IV.2 shows several striking patterns. First, both measures of quality
decrease sharply in the four quarters prior to bankruptcy - a period of time we label
as the "distress" period. Yield (our measure of price) also decreases sharply during
the distress period. The di¤erences in the medians of the residuals of the quality
and price measures, between the pre-distress and distress periods are statistically
di¤erent from zero at the 5% level of signicance using a one-sided Fisher test
for a non-parametric two sample comparison. Second, during bankruptcy both
measures of quality and price increase relative to the distress period. However,
only the di¤erences in the medians of the quality measures for the bankruptcy
and distress periods are signicantly di¤erent from zero.
This initial evidence is interesting, but it does not consider rms with a high
probability of default that do not enter into bankruptcy nor does it control for
the endogeneity of distress or bankruptcy. These simple di¤erences may thus be
driven by other exogenous changes and merely related to rm bankruptcy. We
now turn to the task of disentangling whether bankruptcy and nancial distress
a¤ect rmsdecisions after controlling for other exogenous demand and supply
changes and the endogeneity of a rms nancial condition itself.
IV.3.2-Probability of Default and Bankruptcy
In our analysis of default probability we examine both rms that manage to
avoid bankruptcy and to those that do not. We construct a direct measure of the
probability of default and use this to examine rm quality and pricing decisions.
In addition our analysis takes into account that this probability of default might
be endogenous. The probability of default is based on the Bharath and Shumway
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(2008) probability of default measure which, in turn, is based on the Merton (1974)
model.65 The idea is to compare the rm to a bond using the standard deviation
of its equity and the value of its debt to construct its probability of default. Daily
stock price information was obtained from CRSP and short and long term debt
were obtained from quarterly Compustat. At least 25 stock price observations
were required to construct the standard deviation of equity.
Our measure of default probability di¤ers slightly from Bharath and Shumway
(2008) in two ways. First, we construct the default probability quarterly rather
than annually. Second, we incorporate as an additional component of long run
debt the underfunding of pension liabilities66 given their importance in airline
default.67 A default probability of, say, 50% is interpreted as implying that the
rm has a 50% of chance of entering bankruptcy in the next quarter.










; where V is the economic value of the rm, D is the economic
value of the rms debt and T is the forecasting horizon. This model uses a system of non
linear equations to numerically infer the economic value of the rm and its standard deviation
from the value of equity. Bharath and Shumway (2008) show that a naïve version of this
default probability performs better in hazard models and in out-of-sample forecasts than the
one that uses the numerical solution to obtain the economic value of the rm and its standard
deviation. They proxy the economic value of debt, D, to its face value F; they proxy the
standard deviation of debt value with D = 0:05 + 0:25E , they proxy the economic value of
the rm V as the sum of the face value of the debt plus the value of equity, E, implying that
the standard deviation of the rm value can be derived as V = EE+F E +
F
E+F D . They also
replace the expected return,  , with the last period return, rit 1: Thus, the naïve Mertons













. This expression is based on stock price and
debt value information only.
66Pension net liabilities was constructed from BTS as pension liabilities minus special
funds. If this was less than zero it was replaced by zero because the plan is overfunded.
Pension liabilitiesare the liabilities that a carrier has due to its dened benet pension plan.
Special fundscontain pension assets and other minor assets. Nevertheless, in the data it can
be seen that airlines that do not have a dened benet plan almost invariably have special funds
equal to zero, so special fundsis a good approximation of pension assets.
67Not incorporating pension liabilities or even the long run debt in the default probability
does not a¤ect the results of the paper.
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We impute the probability of default when a corporation owns more than one
airline in the sample, as is the case of AMR, which owns American Airlines and
American Eagle Airlines. In this case, the probability of default was calculated
for AMR and used for both companies. A similar situation occurs in the case of
mergers. When one airline buys another, the subsequent probability of default
for both is constructed using the information of the consolidated rm after the
merger takes place.
We choose Mertons default probability over other traditional distress measure,
like Altmans Z, because the latter is not robust to changes in industry nancial
structure, such as the increasing trend in operational leases (see Gavazza 2010).
Altmans Z is constructed using Multi Discriminant Analysis (MDA), a technique
similar to econometric regressions that selects the nancial ratios with the best
ability to discriminate between distressed and not distressed rms. Using MDA for
the airline industry, Chow, Gritta and Leung (1991) found that interest coverage,
revenue to shareholdersequity and equity to total assets were the most important
factors among the nancial ratios examined for predicting airlinesdefault.68 The
nal computation of the distress indicator assigned each of the three ratios a weight
equivalent to a reduced-form parameter in the regression analysis. Nevertheless,
changing trends in the nancing of aircrafts makes all of the parameters, especially
the interest coverage, quite unstable.
We use Mertons default probability because it is a more structural measure
of default probability, given that it is theoretically derived and depends on basic
elements of a rms risk like its debt and the standard deviation of its equity. In
68Interest coverage was the single most relevant nancial ratio in their estimation.
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addition, in preliminary regressions, Mertons default probability predicted the
bankruptcy episodes in our sample far better than Altmans Z in our sample.
Finally, the advantages of Mertons default probability over Altmans Z apply to
any other nancial ratio given that Altmans Z is composed of multiple nancial
ratios.69
In our analysis of bankruptcy, we examine all rm-quarters in bankruptcy
and compare them to observations in which the rm is in high nancial distress
but is not in bankruptcy. Bankruptcy takes value 1 when a rm declares itself
(or is declared) in Chapter 11 and zero otherwise. There are 59 rm-quarter
observations where the rm is in Chapter 11 bankruptcy in our sample, but there
are no Chapter 7 episodes.70
For the non-bankruptcy sample that we compare to the bankrupt sample, we
use highly distressed observations on rms that enter later into bankruptcy. Given
that we are analyzing the within variation (by including rm xed e¤ects) our
interest is to study how a given rm changes its decisions when transitioning from
distress into bankruptcy. Including rms that are highly distressed but did not
enter into bankruptcy might bias our estimates as some of the rms in the distress
group could not be compared with themselves in the bankruptcy state. The
criterion for selecting distressed rms is that our measure of default probability
exceeds 10%. We select this criterion arbitrarily balancing not dropping too many
non-bankrupt observations while ensuring that the included are, on average, quite
69Mertons default probability is also potentially more accurate than bond ratings given that
bonds rating barely vary over time, and are frequently adjusted downward after a default.
70Independence Air did enter Chapter 7 but shrank to a small size before actually entering
Chapter 7 so they could not be included given that they do not satisfy the 1% market share
requirement of the ATCR.
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distressed, with an average default probability of 66%. Nevertheless, relaxing this
criterion does not change the results.71 We get a nal sample of 121 observations:
59 bankrupt rm-quarters and 62 distressed rm-quarters.
IV.3.3-Demand and Supply Variables
To identify any e¤ect of distress or default on rm quality it is critically im-
portant to control for demand and supply shocks. To construct demand shift
variables (denoted W above), we use the average income and unemployment rate
per state-quarter from the BEA.72 We use these state level variables in the fol-
lowing way for each airline. For each airline, we compute the total number of
passengers originating from each state for each quarter, and divide them by the
total number of passengers that the rm carried in that quarter. This gives us the
percentage of origin passengers that each state represents for each airline. These
percentages are lagged one period, to avoid potential endogeneity problems, and
are multiplied by the average income and unemployment of each state in each
quarter, yielding weighted average income and unemployment at origin for each
airline. We do the same for destinations. To minimize the collinearity between
weighted unemployment and weighted income we use average income weighted at
the origin state and the average unemployment rate weighted at the destination
71All the results hold if we drop observations with default probability lower than 5%, 15%
and 20%, or even higher. However, results do get weaker if we do not drop any observations.
This is to be expected because when dropping observations with default probability lower than
5%, 10%, 15% and 20% the average default probability of the non-bankrupt rms in the sample
is 60%, 66%, 70% and 74% respectively. Comparing those observations with the bankrupt rm
quarters is correctly comparing distressed rms with bankrupt rms. However, when we do not
drop any observations the average default probability of the non-bankrupt rm quarters is 20%,
which implies that these rm-quarters are not that distressed and thus are not good candidates
to be compared with bankrupt rm quarters.
72Average income is in thousands of dollars. Income and yield are in 2009 dollars (cents).
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state.73 We call these variables local income and local unemployment.
Another variable that shifts the demand of a rm is the competition it faces.
Our measure of competition is the weighted average number of competitors that
an airline faces by route. We do the computation in a similar way as the one
for weighted income and unemployment. We sort the data by route and see how
many airlines operate on a given route, measured as a pair of cities.74 Then, we
weight routes using lagged passengers to obtain our measure of competition.
Our supply variables, denoted as X in the previous equations, are based on
cost items that vary over time. The two most important supply variables are
oil prices and the e¢ ciency with which each airline uses fuel. "Oil Fuel Cost"
is constructed as the actual price per gallon that an airline pays in a quarter.
This is obtained by dividing the total fuel cost of an airline by the number of
gallons it used in that quarter. This price measure has two advantages over the
oil spot price per gallon. First, it incorporates airlinesfuel hedging strategies as
this price incorporates future or forward contracts the airlines signed. Second, it
is not perfectly collinear with the time xed e¤ects. Thus, the overall economic
conditions are captured by time xed e¤ects while the specics conditions on an
airlines oil price are captured by this variable. E¢ ciency, on the other hand, is
dened as the number of ASM (available seat miles) an airline produces for each
gallon of fuel they use. The more e¢ ciently airlines use oil, due to new aircraft
technology, the lower the costs of the rm.
Another variable that inuences supply, through cost, is average distance of
73Including both variables at the origin or destination states does not a¤ect the results.
74We exclude airlines that transport less than a 100 passengers in a route-quarter, because
they represent irrelevant competition.
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ights. The longer the distance that an airplane ies the lower the cost of the
ight per mile, because the take-o¤ and landing use more fuel, and thus rms
with shorter ights will look less e¢ cient all other things equal. This variable can
be obtained by dividing Domestic Revenue passenger miles (which is the product
of passengers and miles) by total enplaned passengers.75
Finally, we consider a variable that might a¤ect both demand and supply con-
ditions: Congestion, which measures how congested the markets in which an
airline operates are on average. Given that we are measuring positive character-
istics as increasing variables, we will construct a measure of decongestion rather
than congestion. To construct this measure we take the average percentage of
on time ights (arriving within 15 minutes of the scheduled arrival time) of each
airport, for each rm, excluding the rms own ights. Then, we weight each
airport by the lagged number of passengers for each rm. With this variable we
can control for airport quality independent of the rm itself.
Congestion might a¤ect the rmspricing decision, because operating in con-
gested markets is similar to facing capacity constraints in that the rm cannot
increase supply as much as it would want to. Since operating under capacity con-
straints makes competition softer, we expect that (de)congestion should increase
(decrease) prices. Congestion might a¤ect demand as well, because congestion
might reect high consumer valuation for those markets. Finally, congestion can
also a¤ect our measures of quality, because it is easier to improve on-time per-
formance and decrease the rate of mishandled baggage in less congested markets.
75Controlling for this variable is important because Low Cost Carriers (LCC) typically have
similar yields to major carriers in the data, but after adjusting for the average miles per ight,
which are lower for LCCs, we nd that their yield is actually lower.
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Thus by controlling for congestion we will not penalize a rm because it oper-
ates a large proportion of its ights in congested airports like JFK or La Guardia.
Given that the only quality supply shift variable is decongestion, which also a¤ects
supply and demand, we cannot instrument quality.
IV.3.4-Variable Summary Statistics
Table IV.3 presents summary statistics for the full sample of rms. Table IV.3
shows the 10th percentile, mean, 90th percentile, standard deviation and number
of observations for the variables shown in the left column. The data consists of an
unbalanced panel of 21 airlines for 48 quarters (1st quarter of 1997 to 4th quarter
of 2008).
The main message that Table IV.3 conveys is that there is high variation in
our measures of quality and default probability over the sample. Note that the
statistics on default probability do not include the quarters the rm is actually
in bankruptcy, as we cannot calculate Mertons default probability for companies
without publicly traded stock. Despite not covering these quarters, the default
probability goes from 0% at the 10th percentile to 69.2% at the 90th percentile.
The maximum for this variable is close to 1.
IV.3.5-Financial Condition and Identication
One of the central problems that researchers face when attributing e¤ects
to nancial variables like the probability of default or bankruptcy is that these
variables are endogenous and potentially related to rm quality and prices. Thus
we face a typical identication problem. Having low quality might have driven
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the airline into distress or bankruptcy in the rst place. A similar argument can
be made for high or low prices. Using airline xed e¤ects and time xed e¤ects
partially mitigates this problem but clearly does not solve it.
We solve the identication problem using instrumental variables. To solve the
problem, we need an instrument that a¤ect the probability of default, but does
not a¤ect prices, quantity or quality. This also needs to hold for bankruptcy. We
use the percentage of liquidable assets as instrument for both nancial conditions.
In our rst analysis as default probability and bankruptcy are analyzed separately
only one instrument is needed for identication.
The percentage of liquidable assets proxies for the tangibility of assets and fol-
lows Berger et. al. (1996) formulation. Berger et al. used data from Lexis/Nexis
on the proceeds from discontinued operations reported by a sample of COM-
PUSTAT rms from 1984 to 1993 to compute how much the rms assets were
worth in case of liquidation. They found that a dollar of book value yields 72
cents in liquidation value for accounts receivables, 55 cents in liquidation value
for inventory and 54 cents in liquidation value for their xed assets. Our variable
percentage of liquidable assets is the expected amount that can be recovered in
case of liquidation, using those parameters, divided by the book value of assets.
The percentage of liquidable assets captures what proportion of a rms assets
creditors can recover in case the rm is liquidated. The more creditors can obtain
in case of liquidation, the more they are willing to lend to the rm. Thus a higher
percentage of liquidable assets is likely to be related with higher leverage and also
with a higher probability of default and bankruptcy.
We are not the rst to use the percentage of liquidable assets as an instrument
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for a nancial variable. Campello (2006) uses the percentage of liquidable assets,
following Berger et al. specication, to instrument leverage when analyzing the
e¤ect of leverage on rmssales growth. We just go one step ahead and use it to
instrument default probability and bankruptcy directly.
Conceptually, the percentage of liquidable assets is likely to satisfy the exclu-
sion restriction. It is unlikely that having more valuable assets in case of liquida-
tion will a¤ect directly the quality of a rms product or its prices. What can be
argued is that this measure of tangibility has a relation with performance, because
better performance can lead a rm to acquire more xed assets, which increase the
percentage of liquidable assets. In that case, our instrument could directly a¤ect
the rmsreal outcomes, because it might be capturing unmeasured productivity
to the extent that our controls are not perfect. Nevertheless, this is unlikely, be-
cause we observe that higher percentage of liquidable assets is positively related
with high nancial distress and bankruptcy, states in which productivity is un-
likely to be high. Moreover, Almeida and Campello(2007), and Campello (2007)
(see Table 3 of Campello (2007)) demonstrate that a rms pledgable assets are
independent of its nancial constraints and that there is no direct relationship be-
tween a rms percentage of liquidable assets and a rms performance. Campello
(2007) shows that the only relationship between these two variables is through
the nancing channel. Thus, the rms percentage of liquidable assets is a good
instrument for nancial conditions as is unrelated to a rms performance. In
addition, any story that tries to directly relate the percentage of liquidable assets
with product quality in one direction faces the hurdle that using the same instru-
ment product quality is shown to have opposite e¤ects in nancial distress and
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bankruptcy.
Specically, in the airline industry, our measure of percentage of liquidable
assets captures not only an increase in debt capacity of the rm, but also the
increase in xed assets that occurs when rms acquire aircrafts using secured
debt. According to Benmelech and Bergman (2009) . . . secured debt has become
the primary source of external nance of aircrafts by airlines in the US. Simply
put, secured nancing implies that an airline issue securities to buy aircrafts and
back up those securities using the aircrafts bought as collateral. Thus, when a
rm acquires new aircrafts the xed assets of the rm increases and so does our
measure of percentage of liquidable assets.76 The debt of the rm and the default
probability are likely to be higher as well. Thus, through this channel, a rm with
higher percentage of liquidable assets is also a rm that is more likely to default
in the future given its incremental level of debt.
The exclusion restriction of the percentage of liquidable assets can also be
justied when the secured debt channel is at work. According to Gavazza (2010)
a rm does not continuously buy or sell aircrafts to adjust its capacity. The
decision of buying or selling aircrafts has wide inaction ranges due to the high
transaction costs involved with it. According to his model, a rm acquires an
aircraft only if it has a high enough productivity shock such that it is worth it to
adjust its capacity in the long run (rather than adjusting it on the short run using
operational leases). One consequence of his model is that getting rid of aircraft
76When aircrafts are acquired or there is a nancial lease contract which implies that by the
end of the lease the aircraft will be possessed by the airline, then the aircrafts appear in the
airlinesbalance sheets. When an airline signs an operational lease, that transaction is o¤ the
balance sheet (see Morrell 2007). Therefore, our measure of percentage of liquidable assets is
not a¤ected by operational leases which are not generally acknowledged as a cause of nancial
distress.
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is di¢ cult when the rm needs to downsize its eet. Thus, a rm that acquired
aircrafts in the past is more vulnerable to adverse shocks because it might be highly
indebted and cannot sell their aircrafts to adapt its capacity quickly. Yet, in this
story, the initial factors that might have lead a rm to the purchase an aircraft
are not contemporaneously related with the factors driving the rm into nancial
distress, which occurs ex post. They cannot be contemporaneous because a rm
facing a negative shock (which is the most likely scenario in nancial distress)
will not be likely to acquire any aircraft. Therefore, the positive relationship that
the percentage of liquidable assets and default probability display in our data is
likely to be due to the fact that the percentage of liquidable assets was high from
a period previous to nancial distress and remains high thereafter.
The buying rst with potential distress later story is consistent with the
persistence patterns of the percentage of liquidable assets and default probability
that we nd in our data. When running a regression between the percentage of
liquidable assets on its lag using rm and time xed e¤ects as controls, we nd that
the coe¢ cient of the lag is 0.78, while when doing the same analysis for default
probability is just 0.21 (both are statistically signicant at the 1%). This implies
that the percentage of liquidable assets evolves slowly through time, consistent
with Gavazzas story of inaction bands and with the fact that the distress is much
less predictable.77 ;78
77This argument does not contradict Eisenfelt and Rampini (2008) who argue that rms in
nancial distress are the ones that lease more and buy less. Our argument is about how a rm
enters into distress. They analyze what happens when the rm is already distressed.
78A less obvious channel that could potentially violate the exclusion restriction is the following.
An airline could acquire more assets to expand faster to other markets. In this scenario, the
percentage of liquidable assets may be correlated with faster market expansion. To the extent
that expanding faster reduces the airlines ability to provide high quality it can be argued
that the percentage of liquidable assets may have a direct e¤ect on quality. We test for this
potential e¤ect and nd that even after controlling for revenue growth in the quality and price
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While we argue that the percentage of liquidable assets is a good instrument,
we conduct an additional set of tests to further allay concerns. In additional
tests we substitute out for quantity (total enplaned passengers) in the nancial
condition equation, and vice versa, and thus "borrow" additional instruments -
local income and unemployment and competition - from our demand equation
to the nancial condition equation. In other words, rather than estimating the
nancial condition and demand equations, we estimate the impact that percent-
age of liquidable assets, competition, local income and unemployment have, in
equilibrium, on the rms nancial condition and total emplaned passengers, and
these instrumented versions are used in the system of equations. The advantage
of this approach is that we can use instruments from an overidentied equation
(the demand equation, which has 3 instruments) to increase the number of instru-
ments on other equations (the nancial condition equations, which are exactly
identied). The drawback of this approach is that we cannot estimate the true
equations that describe the demand and nancial conditions, but only the impact
of exogenous variables on their equilibrium values. As estimating the demand and
nancial condition equation is not our goal, we do not consider this a major draw-
back in designing this additional set of tests. 79 Local income is shown to be an
additional strong instrument and predictor- for the default probability and local
unemployment is shown to be a strong instrument and predictor- of bankruptcy.
The main results of the paper are robust to this alternative approach.
equations, the e¤ects of instrumented nancial distress and bankruptcy on quality and prices
were unaltered.
79In a simple setting of supply and demand our approach is analogous to run the price and a




Before estimating our simultaneous equation system, we rst present some
simple regression statistics for quality and pricing. We regress quality and price
on quarterly time and rm xed e¤ects and then examine the residuals of this
simple regression for di¤erent percentiles of default probability (which is of course
not included in the regression). The idea is to see if quality and price exhibit
trends that are associated with nancial distress after removing quarterly time
and rm xed e¤ects.
Examining the results in Table IV.4 we can see that price per mile declines
sharply and monotonically with a rms default probability by quartile. There
is an increase in price (yield) in bankruptcy relative to quartile 4, but not back
to the levels of the other quartiles. The results for quality show that the inverse
of mishandled bags decreases in quartiles 3 and 4 and sharply increases in bank-
ruptcy. On-time performance also shows a sharp increase in bankruptcy relative
to previous quartiles. Thus the most striking fact that we nd in this table is the
sharp increase in quality when rms move into bankruptcy. Quality is the highest
when rms are in bankruptcy, consistent with rms increasing quality as they try
to retain customers and emerge from Chapter 11.
Of course as we noted earlier, nancial distress and bankruptcy are endogenous
states and are correlated with other exogenous factors. Thus we now turn to
examining quality and pricing when controlling for the endogeneity of nancial
distress and bankruptcy through simultaneous equations regressions. We analyze
separately the e¤ect of nancial distress and bankruptcy on product quality and
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prices to avoid imposing any value on the default probability when a rm is in
bankruptcy. Later, in the appendix, we show the results when a value of zero is
imposed on the default probability.
Finally, a subtle distinction needs to be made in the interpretation of the
default probability and bankruptcy when they are instrumented. When instru-
mented, the default probability has to be interpreted as the predicted probability
that a rm enters into bankruptcy the next period, while bankruptcy, when instru-
mented, has to be interpreted as the predicted probability of being in bankruptcy
rather than entering into bankruptcy.
IV.4.1-Financial Distress
We now examine in a multivariate setup how distress a¤ects rms quality and
pricing (yield) decisions. For quality we examine two di¤erent quality supply de-
cisions: mishandled baggage (the inverse of mishandled bags per 1000 customers)
and on-time performance. The key variable we use to examine nancial distress
is Bharath and Shumway naïve probability of default. Table IV.5 presents results
from estimating equations (22) to (25).
We estimate the system using three stage least squares (3SLS) to take advan-
tage of the potential error correlation between the sets of equations. We use rm
xed e¤ects to isolate rmswithin variation in their pricing and quality strate-
gies. We also use time xed e¤ects to absorb time-varying shocks that a¤ect all
rmsquality and prices and that might be correlated with rms nancial dis-
tress. We are able to identify temporary shocks from nancial distress because
nancial distress a¤ects di¤erent rms at di¤erent points in time. Lastly, we
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express our constructed variables in logarithms, whenever possible, to be able to
interpret our results as elasticities. We use logarithms of price (yield), oil fuel cost
price, e¢ ciency and income.80
Econometrically we identify the direct e¤ect of nancial distress on price and
quality by instrumenting price, quantity and the default probability. The instru-
ments that satisfy the exclusion restriction for the price equation are average miles
per ight, oil fuel cost and e¢ ciency; for the quantity equation are competition,
income and unemployment; and for the default probability is the percentage of
liquidable assets. Our tests show that all the instruments but unemployment are
strong.
Table IV.5 shows that rmsprice and quality are negatively a¤ected by their
nancial distress as captured by the default probability. These results are consis-
tent the conict of interest between equity holders and debt holders that arises
in nancial distress. These results as a whole are inconsistent with a cash con-
strained rm being unable to invest in quality as a rm does not need cash to cut
prices.
To understand the economic impact of these results we compare the quality
and price decisions of a rm with zero default probability with itself when it is
highly distressed, with a 66% of default probability. We select this number because
it will allow us to compare our results for nancial distress with the later results
on bankruptcy, for which sample rms have on average a 66% default probability
80Some variables like average miles per ight, competition, percentage of liquidable assets,
unemployment and decongestion have a straight forward interpretation, so we do not express
them in logarithms. We do not express Quantity in logarithms because the within di¤erence in
passengers through time compacts too much. For instance, the di¤erence between 2 million and
2.01 million passengers is almost zero in logarithms. Finally, our quality measures are already
in ratios, so the logarithmic transformation does not provide any further insight.
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when they are not in bankruptcy.81
According to the estimates reported in Table IV.5, a rm that has a probability
of 66% (2/3) of going bankrupt next period charges 31.1% less than a healthy rm
with zero default probability. The e¤ect on quality is also large. A rm with a
66% probability of defaulting next period decreases the inverse of bags mishandled
by 0.065, which represents 0.8 standard deviations, with respect to a rm with
zero default probability. Thus nancial distress represents a change from the
sample mean of 5.8 mishandled bags per 1000 passengers to 8 mishandled bags
per 1000 passengers. Similarly, a rm with a 66% probability of defaulting next
quarter decreases its on-time performance by 0.037 which represents 0.6 standard
deviations, with respect to a rm with zero default probability. Assuming that
the overall percentage of late ights remains at its sample mean, nancial distress
represents a change from late ights arriving 52 minutes late, at the sample mean,
to 69 minutes late.
The results for our control variables also make economic sense. In the pricing
equation, prices are higher when quantity increases, when oil prices are higher
and are lower the less congested are the airports in which they operate. Prices
also decrease with average miles per ight and with fuel e¢ ciency. Lastly, both
measures of quality increase when airports are less congested, but only the e¤ect
on baggage handling rate is statistically signicant.
81With the exception of Alaskan Airlines, Southwest Airlines and JetBlue Airways, all airlines
in our sample were highly distressed at some point in time. Eight airlines entered into bankruptcy
and the others were able to avoid it. There is no substantive di¤erence in the impact that
nancial distress has on airlines pricing and product quality decisions for the rms that later
entered into bankruptcy relative to the ones that managed to avoid it. For both set of airlines,
prices and the quality measure related to mishandled baggage are reduced in a statistically
signicant way with nancial distress. The quality measure related to on-time performance is
also reduced with default probability for both groups. However, this reduction is statistically
signicant only for the rms that later went bankrupt.
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In Table IV.6 we show how the results change when nancial distress is treated
as an exogenous variable. The estimated coe¢ cient of default probability on yield
decreases to -0.046. Though this result is statistically signicant it is an order of
magnitude smaller than the estimated e¤ect when default probability is instru-
mented82. In addition, not instrumenting nancial distress leads to a downward
biased coe¢ cients in the estimation of rm product quality. When nancial dis-
tress is not instrumented its e¤ect on both quality measures is smaller, in absolute
value, and looses statistical signicance. Thus, we show that instrumenting rms
nancial conditions is of critical importance in our results.
Table IV.7 presents the results of additional tests that demonstrates that our
previous results are robust to choices of instruments. Table IV.7 substitutes out
for quantity (total emplaned passengers) in the default probability equation and
thus "borrows" the additional instruments - local income and unemployment and
competition - from our quantity demanded equation. We also substitute out for
default probability in the quantity equation. In other words, we are replacing
equation (24) into (25) and vice versa. Local income in particular is shown to be
an additional strong instrument for the default probability and is exogenous to
rm-level quality and prices.
We nd very similar results to those in Table IV.5. In columns I and II
of Table IV.7, we can see that the e¤ect on an increase in default probability is
associated with a decrease in rm quality - more bags are mishandled and on-time
performance decreases. Column III shows that prices also decrease in nancial
82Lee (2010), treating nancial distress as exogenous, found a similar decrease of between 3






Next, we explore the e¤ect of nancial distress on a rms market share. If
rival rms can perfectly observe the rms price, and are willing to match the
rms prices for all quantitites, then there may be no gain to cutting price for
the nancially distressed rm even in the short run. However, while prices can
be observed, rivals cannot observe the quantity of seats sold at any given price as
discussed earlier. Table IV.8 thus adds a market share equation as an additional
equation to the previous system estimated in Table IV.5.83 This market share
equation was run in the same system as in Table IV.5 but presented separately in
order to provide the intuition of why prices go down when there is distress: rms
are to increase their market share by cutting their prices.
Table IV.8 shows that prices a¤ect rm market shares negatively. Thus, it is
consistent with distressed rms gaining market share in the short run by cutting
their prices. In addition the coe¢ cient on default probability is positive and
statistically signicant at the one-percent level, which means that rms in nancial
distress gain market share for reasons other than price reductions which may
include giving away extra frequent yer miles, a practice United used while it was
in nancial troubles, when it gave away triple the regular ight miles.
IV.4.2-Bankruptcy
We now examine the impact on price and quality of Chapter 11 bankruptcy.
We compare bankrupt rm-quarters with highly distressed rm-quarters. We
estimate a similar set of equations as for the nancial distress case, but now we
83Market share is measured in terms of domestic operating passenger revenue.
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use a bankruptcy indicator rather than the probability of default as the relevant
nancial condition. Thus we estimate equations (26) to (29) using three stages
least squares. The results of are presented in Table IV.9.
Table IV.9 shows that both of our measures of quality, the inverse of bags
mishandled and the on-time performance, increase in bankruptcy relative to the
distressed rm-quarters examined (which have a 66% default probability on aver-
age). There is no signicant e¤ect of bankruptcy on pricing. Low prices during
bankruptcy are consistent with lower short-term cost pressures due to interest
deferral.
The percentage of liquidable assets is a strong and signicant predictor of
bankruptcy even in this small subsample (121 rm-quarter observations). The
rationale behind this pattern is the following. Firms on their way to bankruptcy
reduce both xed assets and short term assets. However, rms with a higher
proportion of xed assets nd it more di¢ cult to avoid bankruptcy as they cannot
generate immediate cash from those assets. Thus, the higher the percentage of
liquidable assets a rm has, the lower its chances of avoiding bankruptcy when
facing a negative shock.
Competition and unemployment are not statistically signicant in the TEP
equation and the income variable has an incorrect sign. Therefore, we do not
expect TEP to be instrumented properly and thus the estimated e¤ects of TEP
on price and quality need to be interpreted with caution. Nonetheless, as the e¤ect
of TEP on prices and quality are not our main focus, having weak instruments
for TEP in this subsample is not a major concern.
The e¤ect of instrumented bankruptcy on both quality measures is positive and
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strongly signicant. When a rm goes from nancial distress into bankruptcy, it
increases the inverse of bags mishandled by 0.0965 which represents a 1.2 standard
deviation increase. Thus bankruptcy represents a change from the estimated
8 mishandled bags per 1000 passengers in nancial distress to 5.2 mishandled
bags per 1000 passengers. Similarly, a rm in bankruptcy increases its on-time
performance by 0.0597 which represents 0.98 standard deviations, with respect to
when it was nancially distressed. Thus bankruptcy represents a change from
late ights arriving 69 minutes late in nancial distress to just 37 minutes late.
In sum, rms in bankruptcy actually increase their quality slightly with respect to
when they are nancially healthy. The intuition is that rms during bankruptcy
are trying hard to regain the condence of consumers and convince the bankruptcy
judge that they are viable in the long run. The increased quality is also consistent
with the rm investing in its reputation for the future. However, similar to the
nancial distress estimation, when bankruptcy is not instrumented its impact on
both quality measures is underestimated. This is shown in Table IV.10. This
result provides further motivation for instrumenting rms nancial conditions.
We conduct an additional analysis where we explore whether our results are
robust to choices of instruments. As in Table IV.7, we substitute out for quantity
(total emplaned passengers) in the bankruptcy equation and we substitute the
bankruptcy equation in the quantity equation. This is equivalent to replace equa-
tion (28) into (29) and vice versa. These results are reported in Table IV.11. Local
unemployment is shown to be an additional strong instrument for bankruptcy and
is exogenous to rm-level quality and prices. We nd very similar results to those
in Table IV.9. In columns I and II of Table IV.11, we can see that bankruptcy is
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associated with an increase in rm quality.
Overall these results on quality in bankruptcy as compared to quality in nan-
cial distress are unique. We show that quality increases in bankruptcy relative
to nancial distress. Our results that prices fall with nancial distress are robust
and agree with Borenstein and Rose (1995) and Busse (2002), although our nd-
ings suggest a di¤erent mechanism by which prices are lower in nancial distress
than the arguments proposed earlier. Borenstein and Rose (1995) argue that con-
sumers might anticipate the rms incentive to reduce quality and thus lower their
demand, implying a reduction in prices. In our setting even after controlling for
rms demand we nd that rms reduce price in the presence of nancial distress.
This mechanism is consistent with rms in nancial distress having a higher dis-
count factor which gives rm managers incentives to cut prices in the short run
in order to generate cash by stealing market shares from its competitors, even
though this might imply lower prots in the future due to a potential price war.
This proposed mechanism is similar to Busse (2002) mechanism as she also argues
that rms in distress cut prices in order to get higher prots in the short run
even if this triggers a price war in the future. The di¤erence is that she attributes
the short run gains to anticipation in ticket purchases while we show they are
compatible with stealing market share from competitors.
The fact that prices fall with measures of default probability also indicates that
default is involuntary in our setting and that rms adopt strategies that may allow
them to recover. In contrast, previous work on voluntary increases in nancial
leverage by Chevalier (1995) and Phillips (1995) shows that prices increase with
voluntary leverage buyouts (LBOs) and management buyouts (MBOs) in most
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industries. Phillips (1995) does show that in the gypsum industry there were
price cuts following the large increases in leverage. In this industry there was
entry by a Canadian rm and gypsum rms that undertook leveraged buyouts
ended up in involuntary nancial distress followed by bankruptcy. Our paper is
unique relative to these papers as we focus on product quality and compare supply
decisions in both distressed and bankruptcy periods.
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IV.5-Conclusions
Our paper examines the impact of nancial distress and bankruptcy on air-
linesquality and pricing decisions. We show that rms reduce quality and price
when faced with nancial distress. These ndings are consistent with rms facing
incentives to take advantage of other stakeholders such as customers when faced
with nancial distress, as in the model of Maksimovic and Titman (1991).
We also show that these incentives to reduce quality disappear during Chap-
ter 11 bankruptcy. We document that rms increase quality relative to pre-
bankruptcy nancial distress. These ndings are consistent with rms in Chapter
11 trying to retain customers and invest in reputation in order to emerge as a
viable company.
Overall our paper shows an important dimension of how a rms nancial
condition impacts its real product market decisions and impacts its customers.
Our analysis can be extended in several directions. Currently, we do not make
a distinction between healthy rms that came out of bankruptcy and rms that
never have gone into bankruptcy. Their product market behavior might di¤er
given more apprehension from customers or creditors about the rms reputation
for product quality. Additionally, it would be interesting to extend the analysis
to see if there is any interaction between the duration of bankruptcy and a rms
product market behavior. We leave these extensions for future research.
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Appendix A
To see that the optimal royalty rate is zero,  = 0; we take total derivatives
on the franchisors prot fr(I; ; S(I; ;
);
) and evaluate them at  = 0:













If by evaluating equation (30) at  = 0 we nd that it is negative this implies
that  = 0 given the concavity properties of the optimization problem.
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Note that in a symmetric equilibrium S = Ŝ:
We can decompose the e¤ect of sales e¤ort over the franchisors prots as
the e¤ect of sales e¤ort over the franchisees symmetric equilibrium prots plus
the e¤ect of the externality and reputation which were not considered by the
franchisees. In other words, we utilized a slightly modied version of the envelope
theorem to obtain that (S;
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Finally, for obtaining dS
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j=0: When using the implicit function theorem we usually
rely on the fact that the denominator is a second order condition, and given
that we know second order conditions are negative, we just need to nd out the
sign of the numerator to get the sign of the whole expression. However, we do
not know the exact sign of @(S(I;);
)
@S
because it is not exactly a second order
condition, it is the second derivative of sales e¤ort over the franchisee prots in a
symmetric equilibrium. In any case, we can overcome this ambiguity by using the
fact that individual sales e¤ort are strategic complements: if the reaction function
of sales e¤ort with respect to royalty rate diminishes the equilibrium sales e¤ort
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j=0 < 0 (36)
Replacing equations (36), (32) and @
fr
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0 + ( )(+) < 0
So,  = 0:
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Recall that as the marginal cost of investment is zero when it is evaluated at
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From equation (32) we know that: @
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> 0 8I: The only term left to look for
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The intuition for the above expression to be greater than zero is that qi(I;Ŝ)
@I
has
to be greater than 1; because if this is not the case, the marginal net benet of the
investment in the franchisee will be lower than its price on the market and thus
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So, I > 0:
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Appendix C
We want to get the sign of @!
@S
: Our starting point is the rst order condition of
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We did not replace the term (@S
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) because any derivative over this term will
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Equation (44) represents the e¤ect that sales e¤ort has on the marginal net
benet of investment for the franchisor. It can be decomposed in 3 terms. First,
the direct e¤ect that sales has on the franchisees marginal net benet of invest-
ment, which is the reduction in the probability of ending the relationship times
the marginal net benet of investment if the relationship continues. Second, the
second derivative of franchisors prots with respect to sales e¤ort times the e¤ect
that investment has over sales e¤ort. The higher the externality is, the higher
these benets are; nevertheless, the marginal net benet of sales e¤ort decreases
with sales e¤ort since the loss in reputation is not su¢ ciently large. The higher
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the sales e¤ort, the nearer Si and S will be and smallest the cost in reputation
the franchisor has. The nal tern is the benet of sales e¤ort over the franchisors





which is the e¤ect that sales e¤ort has over the deriv-
ative of sales e¤ort with respect to investment. This term is of second-order of
magnitude because it does not have to do with how sales e¤ort a¤ect investment,
but how sales e¤ort a¤ect the strength with which investment a¤ects sales e¤ort.
We will focus on the rst-order magnitude e¤ects for simplicity. Including the
second-order term does not change the results. It will only reinforce them since
it has a negative sign and we will argue that the whole expression is negative
without it.
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); is more di¢ cult. As @S
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: Given that we
assumed that  is positive and large this term should be negative and large.
Moreover, we also assumed that, in equilibrium S will be below and near S: This
implies that f( S   S(:)) will be small. To sum up, the rst term of the right
hand side of equation (45) is positive and small, but the second term is large and
negative, making the whole expression negative. This result is completely driven
by our assumption that reputation is vital to the franchisor.
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is of second order of magnitude we just consider the rst term of the





We want to get the sign of @S
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: Using the implicit function theorem on the
franchiseesrst order condition and the fact that sales e¤ort are strategic com-










Deriving equation (5) with respect to  we get:
@fe
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= qi(Ii; Ŝ)f( S   Si)H (48)
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H(1  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Even though this expression might look ambiguous, it is not. Manipulating
equation (5) we get:
qi(Ii; Ŝ)f( S   Si)H   f( S   Si )H(1  )I (49)
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(50)
The expression C 0(Si)  @qi(Ii;Ŝ)@Ŝ (1  ) can be signed using the following logic.
We assumed a monitoring technology such that it increases the sales e¤ort of
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the franchisees, in equilibrium, relative to the sales e¤ort that the franchisees
would have exerted in case there was no monitoring technology. This condition is
satised if the marginal benet of sales e¤ort when there is monitoring is greater
than the marginal benet of sales e¤ort when there is no monitoring. As C 0(Si)
has to be equal to the marginal benet of sales e¤ort when there is monitoring and
@qi(Ii;Ŝ)
@Ŝ
(1   ) is the marginal benet of sales e¤ort when there is no monitoring
technology C 0(Si) >
@qi(Ii;Ŝ)
@Ŝ
(1  ): Therefore, @fe
@S@












and express it in a tractable
fashion. Manipulating the franchisors objective function, assuming  = 1; for

















































































From the envelope theorem we know that @
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Recall that from equation (31) we get @
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Simultaneous Estimation of Financial Distress and Bankruptcy
We analyze the e¤ects of nancial distress and bankruptcy simultaneously on
rm supply decisions. This analysis has e¢ ciency gains, relative to the separate
analyses, but it also has two drawbacks. First, we have to impose a value of zero
on the default probability when it is not dened. Second, we are no longer able
to identify the demand equation since we need to borrow instruments from the
demand to identify the separate e¤ects of default probability and bankruptcy.
The probability of default is not dened when the rm is in bankruptcy. There-
fore, we set it equal to zero for bankrupt observations. Note we are not explicitly
asserting that the rm is not distressed when in bankruptcy, but rather we let
the bankruptcy indicator variable probability pick up the full e¤ect of nancial
distress when the rm is actually in bankruptcy. Ideally, we would use a dummy
variable that takes value of 1 when the default probability has a missing value
and zero otherwise, rather than just imposing a zero. However, this variable will
be perfectly collinear with bankruptcy because when a rm is in bankruptcy its
default probability is not dened. The cost of imposing a zero on the default
probability when it is undened -during bankruptcy- will be explained when we
present the results.
The system of equations we would like to estimate is the following:
Sit = h(Qit; P r_defit; Bankruptit; Yit) (56)
Pit = g(Qit; P r_defit; Bankruptit; Xit) (57)
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Qit = f(Pr_defit; Bankruptit; Pit; Sit;Wit) (58)
Pr_defit = j(Qit; Pit; Sit; Zit) (59)
Bankruptit = k(Qit; Pit; Sit; Zit) (60)
However, as we only have one instrument in Z, the percentage of liquidable assets,
to instrument both nancial conditions we have to use instruments from other
equations to instrument bankruptcy and default probability. We replace equation
(56) in equations (58) to (60) as in the previous analysis, but now we also replace
equations (57) and (58) into equations (59) and (60), equations (59) and (60)
into equation (58) and equation (57) into equation (58), obtaining the following
system:
Sit = h(Qit; P r_defit; Bankruptit; Yit) (61)
Pit = g(Qit; P r_defit; Bankruptit; Xit) (62)
The following three equations for quantity and two nancial condition are esti-
mated in terms of exogenous instruments.
Qit = f(Yit; Xit;Wit; Zit) (63)
Pr_defit = j(Yit; Xit;Wit; Zit) (64)
Bankruptit = k(Yit; Xit;Wit; Zit) (65)
We have 4 instruments to instrument Q, Pr_def and Bankrupt in the price equa-
tion: the percentage of liquidable assets, competition, income and unemployment
and we have seven instruments, these same four instruments plus the oil fuel cost,
average ights per mile and oil e¢ ciency, to instrument Q, Pr_def and Bankrupt
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in the quality equation. The cost of this approach is that now we do not estimate
the demand and nancial condition equations, but only how exogenous variables
a¤ect them in equilibrium. This is not an important issue as the estimation of
demand and nancial condition is not our main goal.
In Table G1, we present rst stage regressions for the three endogenous vari-
ables that we use as explicative variables in the supply equations: Total emplaned
passengers (quantity), default probability and bankruptcy. The estimated equa-
tions correspond to equations (63), (64) and (65). Note that in Table G2 below
we use the tted values of these equations, replacing the predicted default proba-
bility with a zero when the rms are bankrupt, to estimate the e¤ect of nancial
distress and bankruptcy on quality and price.
The results in the rst column of Table G1 are sensible, showing that quantity
increases with income and decreases with unemployment and competition. In
column II, we see that the default probability increases with the percentage of
liquidable assets and decreases with income. What may look surprising is that
default probability decreases with fuel cost; however, this is due to the subsequent,
simultaneous e¤ect that feeds through prices, as prices increase with a rms fuel
cost. Lastly, we see similar e¤ects in column III for bankruptcy.
Table G2 presents our second stage regressions for quality and price. These
equations correspond to equations (61) for both measures of quality and (62) for
prices. To incorporate the potential error correlation structure we estimate the
three equations simultaneously using seemingly unrelated equations (SURE). To
get consistent standard errors we use 50 bootstrap repetitions given that the rst




The results in Table G2 show that nancial distress, as reected in an increase
in the rms default probability, decreases the provision of quality. This result re-
inforces the previous result in Table IV.5. The estimated coe¢ cient on bankruptcy
now has to be interpreted relative to a healthy rm. We see rms in bankruptcy
increase the quality of their baggage handling and on time performance, but this
e¤ect is only statistically signicant for baggage handling. The equality of the co-
e¢ cients of nancial distress and bankruptcy is rejected using a t-test at the 5%
level of signicance. Thus, the results of this estimation method are in agreement
with our previous ndings: quality decreases with nancial distress and increases
in bankruptcy relative to nancial distress. In addition, we nd that quality of
baggage handling is higher in bankruptcy than in the pre-distress period, which
was also the case in our previous set of results. Nevertheless, now we cannot
asses that on-time performance is higher in bankruptcy than in the pre-distress
situation, but at least we can assure it is not lower.
Imposing a zero value for the predicted default probability when the rm is
bankrupt is innocuous if we expect a change in supply behavior before and after
bankruptcy. But, if the supply behavior of a rm does not change in bankruptcy
relative to a distress situation this procedure is somewhat problematic, as in the
case of prices. The predicted default probability and the predicted bankruptcy
are highly collinear when there is no value imposition. So, if we expect prices
to stay as low in bankruptcy as they were in the distress period, by setting the
default probability equal to zero this method assigns the price reduction to bank-
ruptcy even if it is due to nancial distress. Now bankruptcy is the variable that
matches best the inverse behavior of prices as predicted bankruptcy stays high
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in bankruptcy while prices stay low. Default probability, on the other hand does
not stay high while in bankruptcy: it is set equal to zero. This explains why in
Table G2 we observe that prices are una¤ected by default probability while they
are negatively a¤ected by bankruptcy.
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